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THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND:
ROLES, WORK AND PERFORMANCE-Part I
WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, II*
Appellate courts play a central role in our legal system, yet their
operations are not always well understood. Interest in problems of
appellate decision-making led me to undertake this study of the
Court of Appeals of Maryland. My curiosity was aroused in part by
the controversial recommendation that the jurisdiction of the United
States Supreme Court be modified to provide that Court with greater
control over its docket.' Because the Court of Appeals of Maryland at
present has almost complete control of its docket, it seemed a likely
court to study for the effect of such control on the quality of
decisions. Teaching also stimulated my interest in the Court of
Appeals: classroom analysis and criticism of appellate opinions led
me to examine the problems of decision-making, the manner in
which decisions are made, and the content of those decisions. The
study was also self-reinforcing; what began primarily as an inquiry
into the certiorari practices of the Court of Appeals gradually
expanded, as it seemed necessary to elaborate on my observations
and conclusions. This latter drive was in turn reinforced by the
absence of studies such as this at the state level. Although appellate
decision-making has been a much discussed area, 2 scholarly
* A.B. 1967, Dartmouth College; J.D. 1970, Harvard. I wish to thank my
colleagues Chris Brown and David Bogen for their comments and suggestions on an
earlier draft of this Part of this Article. I also wish to thank Gary Aiken of the Law
School Class of 1977 for his research assistance and preparation of the Appendices to
this Article. The State Reporter, James H. Norris, Jr., and his staff were most helpful.
1. See, e.g., COMMISSION ON REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL APPELLATE SYSTEM,
STRUCTURE & INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE (1975);
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE
SUPREME COURT (1972).
2. Excellent general examinations of the appellate decision-making process are
H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (tent. ed. 1958); K. LLEWELLYN, THE
COMMON LAW TRADITION (1960). Recently, Judge Aldisert and Dean Leflar have
edited books which contain a collection of materials by judges and scholars on me
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attention has concentrated on the glitter surrounding the Supreme
Court and its decisions. As a result, the state supreme courts have
been generally, although not universally, neglected by critics and
commentators.3 The Court of Appeals of Maryland has been no
exception to this lack of critical attention. 4 This neglect is
unfortunate because state courts handle the vast majority of
litigation in this country and play, therefore, a major role in the
development of the nation's law. Thus, this Article seeks not only a
better understanding of the workings and practices of state appellate
courts, but also to focus attention on the Court of Appeals of
Maryland.
Part One of this Article has two sections. Section One analyzes
the certiorari process in the Court of Appeals, while Section Two
concentrates on the workload and opinions of the Court. Both of
these sections are based on a study of all published decisions by the
Court of Appeals that were handed down during the September, 1975
Term - that is, between September 1, 1975 and August 31, 1976. The
Law Review has prepared a number of Tables detailing data
concerning those opinions; those Tables can be found in Appendix A
of this Article. Finally, Part Two of the Article is a critical look at
judicial function. R. ALDISERT, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1976); R. LEFLAR, APPELLATE
JUDICIAL OPINIONS (1974).
For first-rate studies of decision-making in particular courts - one federal,
one state - see M. SHICK, LEARNED HAND'S COURT (1970) (Second Circuit); Smith,
The Current Opinions of the Supreme Court of Arkansas: A Study in Craftsmanship,
1 ARK. L. REV. 89 (1947).
3. Among the recent attempts to fill this void are Beatty, Decision Making on
the Iowa Supreme Court - 1965-1969, 19 DRAKE L. REV. 342 (1970); Miller, The Work
of the Michigan Supreme Court During the Survey Period: Statistical Analysis, 11
WAYNE L. REv. 1 (1964); A Brief Survey of the Kentucky Court of Appeals
Opinions Published, 1968-1971, 61 Ky. L.J. 512 (1973). See also Archbald, Stare
Decisis and the Ohio Supreme Court, 9 W. RES. L. REV. 23 (1957). There also has been
an excellent series of "Forewords" to the California Law Review's survey of the work
of that state's highest court.
4. Some recent articles have helped improve this situation. See, e.g., Tomlinson,
Constitutional Limits on the Decisional Powers of Courts and Administrative
Agencies in Maryland, 35 MD. L. REV. 414 (1976). The annual review of Maryland law
by the Maryland Law Review - now in its second year - is also a very welcome step.
A generation ago, Brune & Strahorn, The Court of Appeals of Maryland: A Five-Year
Case Study, 4 MD. L. REv, 343 (1940), studied data on the Court's workload during the
1935-40 period. An admirable description of the Court through the late nineteenth
century is C. BOND, THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND, A HISTORY (1928)
[hereinafter cited as BOND, HISTORY]. Chief Judge Bond also provided an excellent
introduction to a collection of decisions of the Court in the colonial period. C. BOND,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS, 1695-1729 (1933) [hereinafter
cited as BOND, PROCEEDINGS].
MICPEL, a Maryland continuing legal education group, has recently
published a two-volume work, THE MARYLAND APPELLATE PRACTICE HANDBOOK (P.
Sandler ed. 1977).
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the Court's craftsmanship and decision-making; Part Two (to be
published subsequently) will not focus exclusively on the 1975-1976
Term, although it will concentrate on the decisions of that period.
SECTION ONE: CERTIORARI
I. Introduction
The Court of Appeals has its roots in the earliest days of the
colony when the Governor and his Council issued writs of error to
review judgments of the central Provincial Court.5 A court of last
resort was formally established under royal authority in 1694. The
court, typical of the colonial judiciary, consisted of the Governor and
Council.6 In 1776 the Maryland Constitution organized the govern-
ment of the State on the basis of separation of powers, with the
Court of Appeals the highest court in the judicial branch.7 Although
initially the Court of Appeals was not as highly regarded as the
General Court, the state-wide trial court of general jurisdiction," it
shortly earned recognition as an outstanding court.9
For almost the entire two centuries of Maryland's statehood the
Court of Appeals was the sole appellate tribunal in the state.
Following World War II, however, the expansion of Maryland's
population and economy and the revolution in criminal procedure
dramatically increased the workload of the Court of Appeals. This
increase led ultimately to the passage of an amendment to the
Maryland Constitution in 1966, enabling the General Assembly to
establish an intermediate appellate court - the Court of Special
Appeals.10
The jurisdiction of the Court of Special Appeals," originally
quite limited, has been gradually expanded over the past decade,
until finally, as of January 1, 1975, it was given "exclusive initial
5. BOND, PROCEEDINGS, supra note 4, at v-vi.
6. BOND, HISTORY, supra note 4, at 21-26.
7. See generally W. LEwIs, THE MARYLAND CONSTITUTION OF 1776 (1976). The
Court of Appeals did not actually sit as a court until 1780. BOND, HISTORY, supra note
4, at 68-69.
8. BOND, HISTORY, supra note 4, at 88-89. Judge Bond noted that four members
of the General Court (Robert Hanson Harrison, Thomas Johnson, Samuel Chase, and
Gabriel Duvall) were appointed to the Supreme Court; no member of the Court of
Appeals has been so honored. Id. at 89.
9. Id. at 116.
10. MD. CONST. art. IV, § 14A (1966). See also notes 18 to 28 infra and Publisher's
Note, 1 Md. App. v (1968). See also Maryland State Bar Association, Special Report of
the Committee on Judicial Administration (reprinted in full at 1 Md. App. vii (1968)).
Id. at vii (1965).
11. The jurisdiction of the appellate courts of Maryland is elaborated more fully
in Appendix B infra.
19771
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
appellate jurisdiction over any reviewable judgment . . .or other
action of a circuit court, and an orphans' court." 12 As the jurisdiction
of the Court of Special Appeals expanded, there was a corresponding
increase in the amount of litigation which was subject to review in
the Court of Appeals by petition for certiorari rather than by right of
appeal. Today, "the sole method of securing review" of a decision by
the Court of Appeals is by writ of certiorari. 13 Thus, the Court of
Appeals can control fully its appellate docket. And because it has
general jurisdiction over the work of the Court of Special Appeals, 14
the Court of Appeals can shape and control the growth of the
decisional law of the state. Both forms of control, of course, are
extremely important in defining the role played by the Court of
Appeals.
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is not limited to review
of cases heard in the trial courts of the state. Litigation may also
reach the Court if a "question of law" has been certified to it by
either a federal court or an appellate court of another state under the
Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act.15 The final
component of the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals consists of
appeals from the recommendation of a panel of judges which has sat
in cases involving the discipline of attorneys.' 6 Although direct
appeal is no longer available as a route to the court, the Court of
Appeals did hear a number of such cases during the 1975 Term. In
12. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-308 (Cum. Supp. 1976). The Court of
Special Appeals, however, does not have jurisdiction to review cases "in which a final
judgment has been rendered by a circuit court on appeal from the District Court. ..,"
id. at § 12-305, the Court of Appeals having exclusive jurisdiction to review cases in
this area. See Pinkett v. State, 30 Md. App. 458, 468 n.13, 352 A.2d 358, 365 n.13 (1976).
For those unfamiliar with the Maryland court structure, the circuit courts are
the trial courts of general jurisdiction, the district courts have limited civil and
criminal jurisdiction, and the orphans' courts handle probate problems.
13. MD. R.P. 810 (Cum. Supp. 1976). Some effort is required to uncover the
statutory authority for this rule. The appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is
limited to "a case... pending in or decided by the Court of Special Appeals ... ," or a
decision that has been rendered by a circuit court on appeal from a district court. MD.
CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 12-307(1) & (2) (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1976). In both
situations the General Assembly has made certiorari the basis of securing review by
the Court of Appeals. Id. at §§ 12-201 & 12-305.
14. There are several limitations to the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-202 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
15. MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-307(3) (Cum. Supp. 1976). The Act is
codified in id. §§ 12-601 to 609 (1974). The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under
the Act is "exclusive," id. at § 12-307(3) (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1976), and apparently
mandatory, despite the statutory language that the "Court of Appeals may answer
questions of law certified to it .... " Id. at § 12-601 (emphasis added). See Smith v.
Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 267 Md. 149, 297 A.2d 721 (1972).
16. MD. R.P. BV llb (1957 & Cum. Supp. 1976).
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those cases appeals had been docketed before the effective date of
legislation which eliminated this route to the Court. 17
II. The Court And Certiorari
A. Background.
Because the present certiorari system of the Court of Appeals is
a direct result of the creation of the Court of Special Appeals, an
understanding of the Court's certiorari practices entails an inquiry
into the reasons behind the establishment of the Court of Special
Appeals and the subsequent elimination of the appeal as of right to
the Court of Appeals.
The central purpose underlying the creation of the Court of
Special Appeals was the need to reduce the workload of the Court of
Appeals. By the mid-1950's, the pressures of population explosion,
increased economic activity, and a rise in appeals in criminal cases
had generated a staggering caseload for the Court of Appeals.18 Two
special committees of the Maryland State Bar Association (the Eney
Commission in 195819 and the Case Commission in 196520)
recommended the establishment of an intermediate appellate court
in order to relieve the burden. The primary concern of these blue-
ribbon commissions was that the heavy workload of the Court of
Appeals would lead not only to delay, but also to deterioration in the
quality of the Court's work.21 This consideration dramatized the
need to afford the Court of Appeals adequate time for proper
deliberation. The Eney Commission expressed its concern this way:
The judges of the Court of Appeals must be afforded sufficient
time to study thoroughly the cases presented to them so that,
while maintaining high quality in their work, they can meet
their dual responsibility: dispensing justice to Individual
litigants, and molding the body of the law in Maryland. 22
17. 1973 Md. Laws, 1st Sp. Sess., ch. 2, § 1.
18. FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE CASELOAD OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS, 64 TRANS. MD. ST. B.A. 1, 393 app. (1959) [hereinafter cited as ENEY
REPORT].
19. Id.
20. COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, SPECIAL REPORT, 70 TRANS. MD.
ST. B.A. 244 (1965) [hereinafter cited as CASE REPORTI.
21. See, e.g., ENEY REPORT, supra note 18, at 395. Concern was also expressed
that the Court might have to increase its use of nisi prius judges, "thereby in effect
creating a modified panel system." Id.
22. CASE REPORT, supra note 20, at 247. An earlier change in the structure of the
Court of Appeals was also motivated in part by this concern. See Soper, Reorganiza-
tion of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, 8 MD. L. REV. 91 (1944).
1977]
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Similar concerns were expressed several years ago by yet another
special panel (The Russell Commission), 23 in discussing its recom-
mendation that an all-certiorari Court of Appeals be created:
An appellate court does not simply decide cases: it is charged
with the duty in most cases to state the reasons for a decision in
an opinion. The opinion serves several important purposes: to
acquaint the parties of the reasons for the actions of the court; to
insure, through the process of written articulation, that prelimi-
nary assessments are substantiated or changed as a result of a
thoughtful analysis and to preserve a record of the decision
declaring what is the law of the State on the issue decided ...
The quality of Court of Appeals opinions is therefore of critical
importance not only for the justice of the moment to litigants
before the court, but also for the exercise of proper leadership by
the court through the precision, thoughtfulness, and craftsman-
ship that are at the heart of better laws and a wiser, more even-
handed justice.24
Thus, the Court of Special Appeals was designed, and its
jurisdiction enlarged, 25 to ease the workload of the Court of Appeals
sufficiently to enable that Court to maintain a high level of
performance. Presumably this lightened caseload would enable the
writer of an opinion to spend more time upon his product and afford
the Court as a body more time for reflection and intramural
discussion of problems before it.26 That this "maturing of collective
thought" 27 is indeed time-consuming cannot be doubted. And,
assuming that extended deliberations help to achieve true consen-
sus, 28 there would be a solid benefit from the reduction in the Court's
workload, for the Court would be guiding the orderly development of
23. COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL REFORM, FINAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF MARYLAND 12 (1974) [hereinafter cited as RUSSELL
REPORT].
24. Id. at 14.
25. The gradual expansion of the jurisdiction of the Court of Special Appeals over
the past decade was anticipated at the time the Court of Special Appeals was
established. Id. at 12. Creation of an all-certiorari Court of Appeals came following
such a recommendation in the RUSSELL REPORT.
26. The clearest manifestation of this desire, of course, was the establishment of
an all-certiorari Court of Appeals. Earlier reports, however, had also emphasized the
"stringent" nature of the review to be exercised by the Court of Appeals. See ENEY
REPORT, supra note 18, at 406.
27. Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term - Foreword: The Time Chart of the
Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 100 (1959).
28. Compare id. and Griswold, The Supreme Court, 1959 Term - Foreword: Of
Time and Attitudes - Professor Hart and Judge Arnold, 74 HARV. L. REV. 81 (1960),
with Arnold, Professor Hart's Theology, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1298 (1960).
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the law of the State through better crafted and more thoughtful
opinions.
B. Standards.
Neither the legislature, in establishing and maintaining a
system of review by certiorari, nor the Court of Appeals, in
implementing the jurisdiction that it has been given, has given
much guidance concerning standards to be applied to certiorari
petitions. The statutes are almost silent on the question; the only
exception involves the rather rare situation of certiorari to a circuit
court where the case had been appealed to that court from a
judgment by a district court. In those cases the General Assembly
has instructed that a writ may be issued: "[Ilf it appears to the Court
of Appeals .. . that: (1) Review is necessary to secure uniformity of
decision . . . ; or (2) There are other special circumstances rendering
it desirable and in the public interest that the decision be
reviewed. ' 29 While the first part of this instruction, concerning
conflicts among the lower courts, does give some guidance, the
second part is of little assistance, for neither the General Assembly
nor the Court of Appeals has made any attempt to define either
"desirable" or "public interest."-" Nor has the General Assembly
given any instructions on the standards to be applied in the far more
common situation of petitions seeking review of a decision by the
Court of Special Appeals. 31 There is a similar lack of guidance from
the Maryland Rules of Procedure, which require only that the
petition for certiorari must contain a "concise argument in support
of the petition." 32 Again, no effort has been made to define what the
Court wants in the petition. Moreover, the reports of the special
commissions that led to the creation of the Court of Special Appeals
and the eventual elimination of the appellate jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals shed little light on the criteria to be applied to the
problem of whether to grant a petition for certiorari. Indeed, except
for general precatory statements which are of little use in any
29. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-305 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
30. It is not surprising, therefore, that many, if not most, petitions for certiorari
are similarly conclusory. Influenced perhaps by the apparent lack of interest in the
subject by court and legislature, the only statement in many petitions, apart from an
argument on the merits, relating to the question of why the petition should be granted
is that to do so would be "in the public interest."
31. The only other statutory provision even remotely on point is MD. CTS. & JUD.
PRoc. CODE ANN. § 12-203 (1974), which prohibits a rule that would require the assent
of more than three judges to the grant of a writ of certiorari.
32. MD. R.P. 811a3(g) (1977).
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particular situation, 33 there is no evidence that these panels devoted
any thought to the question of how the Court of Appeals should
exercise the freedom it has to control its caseload. Finally, the Court
of Appeals 34 has successfully avoided establishing guidelines for the
grant of a petition of certiorari by labeling its decision to do so an
"exercise of discretion; '35 since the Court has not addressed the
question, "discretion to do what?", it apparently feels itself under no
institutional obligation to explain the factors it considers important
with respect to certiorari decisions. 36
While little guidance has been given by the Court or the
legislature on the question of standards to be applied in judging a
petition for review, such standards can be elaborated. To do so it is
first necessary to define the role of the Court of Appeals today. Judge
Shirley Hufstedler, writing generally on the institutional roles of
appellate courts, analyzed the problem in this fashion:
Appellate courts serve two quite different functions: First,
appellate courts review the trial record for error in the particular
case. We can call this the review for correctness. Second,
appellate courts use the cases before them as vehicles for stating
and applying constitutional principles, for authoritatively
interpreting statutes, for formulating and expressing policy on
legal issues of system-wide concern, for developing the common
law, and for supervising each level of the system below them. We
can call the second set of tasks the institutional functions - the
business of Government. 37
Twenty years ago the Eney Commission, writing to urge the creation
of an intermediate appellate court, said much the same thing,
identifying two functions of an appellate court, (a) the "private
function," which ensures that "justice is done to the litigants in each
individual case," and (b) the "public function, . . . settl[ing] and
33. See, e.g., RUSSELL REPORT, supra note 23: the Court of Appeals will have "the
option to choose the cases it will decide by certiorari," id. at 18; certiorari should be
"liberally granted," id. at 19.
34. Several members of the Court have expressed individual views concerning the
importance of various factors in deciding whether to grant certiorari. See note 59
infra.
35. Walston v. Sun Cab Co., 267 Md. 559, 298 A.2d 391 (1973) (per Barnes, J.). The
Court went on to observe: "The immediate purpose of this constitutional amendment
[permitting the establishment of the Court of Special Appeals] was to enable the
General Assembly to relieve this Court of the substantial increase of criminal appeals
which had inundated the Court .... " Id. at 564-65, 298 A.2d at 395.
36. See also text accompanying notes 56 to 59 infra.
37. Hufstedler, New Blocks for Old Pyramids: Reshaping the Judicial System, 44
S. CAL. L. REV. 901, 910 (1971).
[VOL. 37
THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
giv[ing] authoritative expression to the developing body of the
law.' '38
The Eney Commission thought those two functions were "of
equal importance in the judicial system of Maryland." 39 As the
jurisdiction of the Court of Special Appeals increased, however, the
need to exercise the "private" or "correctness" function of the Court
of Appeals decreased. As Judge Hufstedler has observed: "with each
rise in the appellate structure, the importance of the review for
correctness diminishes and the importance of the institutional
[public] function increases." 4
This change in the relative importance of the roles of the Courts
of Appeal can be explained without difficulty. Litigants are given
one appeal as a matter of right to the Court of Special Appeals4 1 as
an expression of concern that "justice be done in each case."42 This
review seeks to ensure "correctness"; it is an exercise of the "private"
function of the state's appellate system. There is no reason, however,
to suppose that the Court of Appeals as an institution possesses any
greater expertise in reviewing the record for error going only to the
correctness of the individual decision than does the Court of Special
Appeals;43 further review by the Court of Appeals of such problems
is unlikely to add anything but expense and delay to the legal
process. More important, an attempt to perform such a role would
seriously diminish the time and energy that the Court of Appeals
can devote to its "public" function of guiding and controlling the
development of state law, time and energy that could be used "to
write opinions which will 'give authoritative expression to the
38. ENEY REPORT, supra note 18, at 400.
39. Id.
40. Hufstedler, supra note 37, at 910.
41. An exception is the denial of the right to appeal "from a final judgment of a
court ... in reviewing the decision of the District Court, an administrative agency, or
a local legislative body." MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-302(a) (1974). Even
in these cases, however, the losing party has had an appeal as a matter of right to the
circuit court.
42. Hufstedler, supra note 37, at 910.
43. Commentators have questioned whether any appellate court has greater
expertise in this area than the trial court that heard the matter. See Wright, The
Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751 (1957). Judge
Aldisert, supra note 2, at 727, has observed:
In the 1968 court year each United States Circuit Judge on the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit read carefully the briefs in about 100
cases. By 1973 he was required to read some 240 cases in addition to reviewing
opinions by panels of which he was not a member. Is it realistic to expect that
each circuit judge reads the record in each case on which he sits?
Equally on point is the famous remark by Justice Jackson: "We are not final because
we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final." Brown v. Allen, 344
U.S. 443, 540 (1953).
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developing body of law.' ,44 After all, it was the desire to afford the
Court ample opportunity to research, analyze, consider, and express
its decisions in writing that led to the creation of the Court of Special
Appeals and the grant to the Court of Appeals of effective control
over its own docket.
Recognition that the primary role of the Court of Appeals is the
performance of its "public" or "institutional" function helps to
determine which petitions for review should be granted by the Court.
Expressed briefly, the readiness of the Court of Appeals to grant
review should depend primarily upon its perception of the likelihood
that the error asserted in the petition, if left uncorrected, will have
an impact in cases other than the one currently before the Court. If
error of that kind - institutional error, in other words - is not
corrected by the Court of Appeals, it may well be applied as
precedent by other courts, compounding the original problem; in
these cases the obligation of the Court of Appeals to control the
development of state law is most keen. Thus, the Court of Appeals
should view problems of interpretation of federal and state
constitutions, statutes, and its own precedents as more likely
subjects for review than claimed errors in the fact-finding process.
Also important are questions involving allegedly inconsistent
decisions by lower courts; 45 in these cases the Court is not only
acting in its supervisory role, but also attempting to ameliorate the
very real sense of injustice that is felt when a litigant sees (or
believes he sees) a "like" case not being treated in "like" fashion. All
of the above situations implicate the Court's "public" function in a
significant way.46 Occasionally, however, the Court of Appeals may
feel it advisable to review a case which has little or no impact on the
"orderly development" of the law of the state. In some of these cases,
review of the record by the Court of Appeals may even be necessary;
it is likely, for example, that society expects that there be full
appellate review before a death sentence is carried out, despite the
44. ENEY REPORT, supra note 18, at 400.
45. It is significant that the resolution of such conflicts is the only ground for
granting a petition mentioned by the legislature, albeit in the context of reviewing
cases heard by the circuit courts on appeal from the district court. MD. CTS. & JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-305(1) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
46. The importance of "wise" selection of cases to review is strengthened by the
recognition that the Court of Appeals can review only a small fraction of cases heard
in the Court of Special Appeals. In addition, the Court of Appeals is the sole authority
for reviewing district court cases that have been appealed to a circuit court. Thus, it is
vital that the Court select its cases wisely if it is to control effectively the development
of the law of the State. Cf. Betten, Institutional Reform in the Federal Appellate
Courts, 52 IND. L.J. 63, 65-68 (1976) (a good presentation of the literature concerning
this problem in the federal system).
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cost, delay, and necessary intrusion on the Court's institutional
function.47 Finally, it is quite possible that the demands on the
"public" function of the Court will not be so heavy as to prevent the
exercise of the "private" function in a limited number of cases.
The presence of factors supporting review in a given petition
does not necessarily mean the Court of Appeals will or should hear
the case. There are a variety of legitimate reasons why the Court
may not want to hear such a case.48 Even if it is likely, for example,
that the Court of Special Appeals has badly misinterpreted an
important statute, the Court may still wish to deny a petition
seeking review of that construction. Perhaps the case did not present
the issue properly because its factual setting was unclear; instead of
settling the waters, a decision predicated on an insecure factual base
may well muddy them further. The Court may also feel that the
briefs and argument that can be expected from the litigants in the
case at bar will not provide the "adversarial" help that a court needs
in order to clarify its own thinking in the area. Or the Court may feel
that the time has not come for deciding a particular issue, that the
issue has not sufficiently "ripened" in the decisions of the lower
courts, in the courts of other jurisdictions, or in critical commentary
so that the Court of Appeals will feel confident of the correctness of
the decision it reaches.4 9 Finally, those interested in changing the
holding below may vote against the grant of certiorari if they feel
a majority of the Court will not agree - better a dismissal of certi-
orari than a hardening of adverse precedent in the area.50 Such
considerations, together with the underlying need of the Court to
ensure that it has sufficient time for proper preparation and
consideration of each case, suggest that the Court may properly feel
no obligation to take every case that comes its way, even if those
47. See Denniston, After Gilmore, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 29, 1977, at 10.
48. Detailed analyses of problems in the Supreme Court regarding treatment of
certiorari petitions can be found in a series of articles by Fowler Harper (with
different co-authors) in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review: Harper &
Rosenthal, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do in the 1949 Term, 99 U. OF PA. L.
REV. 293 (1950); Harper & Etherington, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do During
the 1950 Term, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 354 (1951); Harper & Pratt, What the Supreme
Court Did Not Do During the 1951 Term, 101 U. OF PA. L. REV. 439 (1953); Harper &
Leibowitz, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do During the 1952 Term, 102 U. OF PA.
L. REV. 427 (1954).
49. An example of this wait-and-see approach from an earlier Court of Appeals is
White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 223 A.2d 763 (1965), where the Court, speaking through
Judge Oppenheimer, refused to discard the lex loci delicti rule in torts conflicts cases
until a "sound, practical alternative is evolved." Id. at 355, 223 A.2d at 767.
50. Less defensible, perhaps, is the possibility that the Court may believe the




cases present serious questions of unsettled law. That flexibility does
not justify, however, the lack of guidance from the Court of Appeals
concerning its certiorari practice, particularly with respect to what
factors it considers to be significant in reviewing a petition.
The Court's failure to elaborate standards for certiorari may
have several undesirable consequences. Because the volume of
petitions to a court reflects, in part at least, the expectation of
petitioners that their petitions will be granted, 51 the lack of
guidelines probably increases the number of petitions presented to
the Court. This, of course, increases the workload of the Court and
decreases the amount of time the Court can spend on cases it does
take. In addition, uncertainty concerning the possibility of review
increases the costs to litigants - petitioners and respondents alike.
Another adverse effect flowing from the absence of criteria
defining the "certworthiness" of a case is that the petitioner with a
potentially serious claim does not know how to draft his petition, for
the Maryland Rules of Procedure only tell a petitioner that he is to
prepare "a concise argument" as to why the writ should be
granted.5 2 Should he spend his limited time in an effort to convince
the Court of Appeals -of error below? Should he try to claim attention
with the novelty or ubiquity of the claim he presents? Should he
raise both points and risk losing the Court's attention with a prolix
petition?5 3 This uncertainty does not help the reputation - and,
thus, the acceptance - of the Court in the legal community, nor,
more practically, does the uncertainty do anything to help the Court
in deciding whether certiorari should be granted. That situation
would be remedied if petitioners were encouraged to spend a
51. See Casper & Posner, A Study of the Supreme Court's Caseload, 3 J. LEG.
STUD. 339, 361 (1974); Wright, supra note 43, at 779. At least with institutional
litigants the petitioning process might also turn on the perceived receptivity of the
Court to the substantive claims that might be advanced. See Lewin, Avoiding the
Supreme Court, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1976, § 6 (Magazine), at 31. On the other hand, a
large percentage of petitions to the Court are filed by criminal defendants. It is
doubtful that any system would discourage a significant number of these petitions.
52. MD. R.P. 811a3(g) (Repl. Vol. 1977). The petitioner is also told "failure ... to
present with ... brevity ... whatever is essential to a ready and adequate
understanding ... will be a sufficient reason for denying the petition." Id. at 811a(4).
53. The litigant's dilemma, it must be emphasized, is very real. The Rules
encourage "brevity" in certiorari petitions, yet legal issues do not always lend
themselves to brief treatment. If it is not clear to an attorney what the Court is
looking for in a petition, he must choose between the Scylla of length and the
Charybdis of omission of what might be important. If the petition is denied for either
sin the Court of Appeals may well have missed a case of importance for the entire
state.
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substantial part of their effort in showing the Court why review is
important to the people of the State.5 4
Most important, the absence of expressed institutional criteria to
be applied to certiorari decisions diminishes the protection offered
litigants against arbitrary decision-making. When such criteria
exist, however, they can be used as a basis for analysis and criticism
of the decisions, both by litigants seeking assurances of equality and
rationality in treatment and by commentators attempting to make
the Court aware that there is a critical audience reviewing its
decisions.
On the other hand, stating criteria with respect to its view of the
"certworthiness" of a case does not mean that the Court must
explain a decision not to grant a petition; as Justice Frankfurter
once noted, "practical considerations preclude" such a course.55
Thus, the Court's assertion that it has "discretion" 56 in certiorari
decisions is justified in that it need not give reasons for its certiorari
decisions, and because it has leeway to define what it believes to be a
worthwhile subject for review. 57 But that assertion does not justify
failure to establish rules for the game the Court is playing. Judges,
like other governmental officials, operate within the framework
provided by "established rules of law.15 8 The latitude of the Court of
54. Compare the advice once given by Chief Justice Vinson:
Lawyers might be well-advised in preparing petitions for certiorari, to
spend a little less time discussing the merits of their cases and a little more
time demonstrating why it is important that the Court should hear them. By
that I do not mean that the petition should paraphrase the standards set out
in Rule 38 [now Rule 19] of the Supreme Court Rules,. . . as so many petitions
do now. What the Court is interested in is the actual, practical effect of the
disputed decision - its consequences for other litigants and in other
situations. A petition for certiorari should explain why it is vital that the
question involved be decided finally by the Supreme Court. If it only succeeds
in demonstrating that the decision below may be erroneous, it has not fulfilled
its purpose.
Vinson, Work of the Federal Courts, 69 S. Ct. v-vi (1949).
55. Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 918 (1950) (separate
statement by Justice Frankfurter concerning the denial of certiorari). See also R.
STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 210-13 (4th ed. 1969).
56. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
57. The Court also has "discretion" because its certiorari decisions are non-
reviewable. For a good discussion of types of judicial "discretion," see Dworkin, The
Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 14, 32-36 (1967).
58. The quote is from Walter v. Board of County Comm'rs, 179 Md. 665, 668, 22
A.2d 472, 474 (1941), where the Court, in discussing the standard for issuing a writ of
mandamus, stated that mandamus "rests in the sound discretion of the Court which
must not be arbitrary, but is to be exercised under established rules of law." See also
Saltzgaver v. Saltzgaver, 182 Md. 624, 35 A.2d 810 (1944), where the Court spoke
approvingly of Lord Mansfield's dictum that "[d]iscretion, where applied by a court of
justice, means sound discretion guided by law." Id. at 635, 35 A.2d at 815. Compare
the situation of a trial judge who is said to have "discretion" concerning the grant of a
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Appeals with respect to its certiorari power should be similarly
cabined in order to help litigants, lawyers and the public understand
its approach to the certiorari process.5 9 Such an understanding
would help the Court to perform its job and to maintain confidence
in its decision-making, for, as Kenneth Culp Davis has written,
"[w]here law ends, discretion begins." 6° While it is impossible to
eliminate some of the discretionary elements such as lack of
explanation for its decisions and the absence of reviewability, the
Court can exercise its "discretion" within self-imposed boundaries.
This it should do.
C. A Look at the Certiorari Decisions.
This sub-section will discuss the decisions by the Court during
the study Term regarding petitions for review. The section begins
with an examination of a set of petitions, followed by a discussion of
cases where review was denied by the Court, and then of cases which
were heard by the Court. Special emphasis has been placed on the
Court's frequent practice of taking cases that have not been first
heard by the Court of Special Appeals.
new trial, but if he "abuses" that power - that is, goes beyond an accepted latitude -
his decision will be called to task. E.g., Lancaster v. Gardiner, 225 Md. 260, 170 A.2d
181 (1961).
59. Judge Levine of the Court of Appeals, in a recent speech to the Young
Lawyers Section of the Maryland State Bar Association, made an effort to outline the
approach of the Court to the problem of granting certiorari. As described by Judge
Levine, the approach of the Court to the problem of defining a case having "public
interest" does not appear to be significantly different from the suggestions made in
this Article. Of particular importance is Judge Levine's assertion that "error on the
part of a lower court is itself not sufficient to carry the day." His speech also contains
useful examples of cases that he, at least, considered to be of "public interest." Levine,
Certiorari Procedures in the Maryland Court of Appeals, The Daily Record, Jan. 20,
1977, at 1, col. 2.
Further discussion of certiorari procedures by individual members of the
Court can be found in a series of interviews with a newspaper reporter. Coltman,
Mystique of the Maryland Judiciary, Baltimore Sun, Sept. 5,1976, at Al, A8. Again,
the reported responses of the judges is not dissimilar to that suggested in this Article.
A noteworthy exception is the emphasis placed by Judge Smith on the importance of
error below as a basis for granting review.
While such informal expressions by members of the Court are useful, they do
not satisfy the need for standards established by the Court - a formal, accessible,
institutional set of characteristics defining in advance for petitioners what is
important to the Court.
60. K. DAvIs, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 3 (1971). This is a reworking of William
Pitt's famous dictum, "Where law ends, tyranny begins."
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1. The Certiorari Process.
Table I in the Appendix is a compilation of data concerning 100
petitions to the Court of Appeals seeking review by certiorari. Most
of the data in the Table are self-explanatory. Striking among those
figures are what appear to be a quite low number of pro se
petitions, 61 and the small number of petitions which sought
expedited review by the Court of Appeals (particularly in light of the
large number of cases decided by the Court which had not been
heard in the intermediate court). Also surprising are the small
number - 15 - of answers to petitions 62 since it might be expected
that most attorneys for respondents would desire to argue why "the
public interest" requires no review.
a. The Cases Not Heard.
For the most part, a reading of petitions denied by the Court
reveals little basis for questioning the Court's determination that
"there has been no showing that review by certiorari is desirable and
in the public interest. '63 Typical is Morris v. State,64 in which the
only question presented by the petition was whether sufficient
evidence had been presented at trial to sustain petitioner's convic-
tion. The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported per curiam
decision, had adopted the trial judge's opinion that sufficient
evidence had been introduced. The case presented no interesting,
novel, or important question of law. The issue raised by petitioner
had been decided by a competent trial judge,65 the person most likely
to be aware of the merits of the claim, and had already been
reviewed by one appellate court. Because of the limited scope of
petitioner's claim, the "public" function of the Court of Appeals was
not involved. In such a situation, therefore, little or nothing would be
gained if the Court of Appeals were to review petitioner's case.
Further, because the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals had not
been reported and therefore lacked precedential value,6 6 the Court of
61. The low number of pro se petitions may be due to representation of indigents
by the Public Defender, and the removal of jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in
most cases that seek review of a criminal conviction by a route other than direct
appeal.
62. Responses to petitions are authorized by MD. R.P. 811b (1977).
63. This is the standard wording of the Court's order denying a petition.
64. Unreported per curiam in Court of Special Appeals; cert. denied, 274 Md. 730
(1975) (denials of certiorari by the Court of Appeals are not reported in the Atlantic
Reporter).
65. Karwacki, J., of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City.
66. See MD. R.P. 1092(c) (1977).
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Appeals did not need to be concerned about the effect of that opinion
on future cases.
While cases like Morris presented little trouble, more difficult
questions were raised in other petitions. Several presented claims
involving significant legal issues that had not been definitively
resolved by the Court of Appeals, and in those cases it could be
argued that certiorari should have been granted by the Court of
Appeals. An example is Becker v. Crown Central Petroleum Co.,67 in
which a gas station operator whose franchise had been terminated
sought reinstatement of his franchise on the ground that the
defendant had not given the pre-termination notice required under
the Maryland Gasoline Marketing Act.6 8 The Court of Special
Appeals denied Becker's request for equitable relief because damages
are the only remedy provided by the Act.69 Becker presented a
colorable claim for review, involving both the "private" and "public"
functions of the Court. First, the opinion of the Court of Special
Appeals in Becker was the first appellate interpretation of this
section of the statute. That opinion was reported and available as
precedent. Further, the construction of the statute by the Court of
Special Appeals raised both an issue of statutory interpretation and
a more general problem of the extent to which a court of equity can
grant relief in the absence of statutory authorization. 0 Finally, the
question was one in which trial courts have a special need for
guidance because a request for injunctive relief demands as quick
and sure a response as possible. Thus, the claim on the Court's
"public" role, while not as great as in some cases heard by the Court,
was significant and a good deal more compelling than in many
cases that were taken for review.71
Other petitions that were denied also call into question the
Court's policy in granting certiorari. The petitioner in Burriss v.
State,72 for example, sought to overturn the revocation of his
67. 26 Md. App. 596, 340 A.2d 324, cert. denied, 276 Md. 738 (1975).
68. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 11-301 to 308 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1976).
69. 26 Md. App. at 616, 340 A.2d at 336.
70. Federal cases take a more liberal approach to the award of equitable relief.
See, e.g., Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946).
71. See notes 85-87 infra. It is possible that review was denied in Becker because
the Court wished to delay deciding questions concerning the details of the Gasoline
Marketing Act until the constitutional status of that Act was resolved in a case then
working its way through the courts, Governor of Maryland v. Exxon Corp., 279 Md.
410, 372 A.2d 237 (1977). Becker, however, did not itself raise any constitutional
issues, and Exxon (which upheld the constitutionality of the Act) did not involve the
part of the statute at issue in Becker.
72. No. 206, Sept. Term, 1975. No. 871 (Court of Special Appeals, May 26, 1975),
cert. denied, 276 Md. 739 (1975).
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probationary status; the revocation had been based largely on
hearsay testimony presented by a probation officer. The petitioner
asserted that the failure of the trial judge to permit him to confront
his accusers violated his constitutional rights 73 and that other
jurisdictions had decided the issue differently than the Court of
Special Appeals had in his case.7 4 Except that the decision of the
Court of Special Appeals was not published and thus not prece-
dent,75 all the elements for review were present: the issue had
potential applicability to a large number of cases; the case involved
the interpretation of recent decisions of the Supreme Court; other
jurisdictions, it was asserted, had reached a different position than
that taken by the Court of Special Appeals; and, finally, the
petitioner himself was seriously affected by the decision below.
Although the Court of Appeals may have agreed with the Court of
Special Appeals on the merits, the issue was important enough, and
recurrent enough, to warrant definitive treatment.76
Another question concerning the Court's certiorari procedure is
raised by petitions which do not present significant institutional
issues, but whose claim on the Court's private function may make
them seem more worthy of being heard than many cases heard by
the Court. 77 Criminal cases, because of their impact on an
individual, best illustrate this type of case. In Holmes v. State, for
example, the defendant had been sentenced to two concurrent life
terms for murder and rape. Holmes' petition was based primarily on
a straightforward Miranda question.7 9 Because the law to be applied
73. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 2, 5-6 (citing Morissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471 (1972), and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973)).
74. Id. at 7. See State v. Marlar, 20 Ariz. App. 191, 511 P.2d 204 (1973).
75. Although the reporting of a case by the Court of Special Appeals should be a
factor in determining whether to grant review, it should not, by any means, be
considered a prerequisite. Otherwise, the lower court's opinion of the importance of
the case would control the docket of the higher court.
76. Somewhat similar is Ward v, State, No. 217 (Court of Appeals, Sept. 8, 1975).
There, petitioner, who had been convicted on the basis of a submission of stipulated
facts to the trial judge, argued that the standard applied to determine if a guilty plea
had been a knowing and intentional relinquishment of rights should also be applied
in his situation. The Court of Special Appeals, relying on Palmer v. State, 19 Md. App.
678, 313 A.2d 698, cert. denied, 271 Md. 742 (1974), had rejected the argument. Ward v.
State, No. 1014 (Court of Special Appeals, May 21, 1975).
77. See text accompanying notes 85-87 infra.
78. Holmes v. State, No. 216 (Court of Appeals, Sept. 8, 1975).
79. The petition requested review of the trial judge's preliminary finding that
Holmes' confession was voluntarily given and questioned the admissibility of
testimony of a police officer who had conducted a second interrogation of the
defendant without repeating Miranda warnings as required by the Court of Special
Appeals in Brown v. State, 6 Md. App. 564, 252 A.2d 272 (1969).
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was rather well settled, the case did not involve the institutional role
of the court; surely, however, the claim of someone facing a long
prison sentence is as worthy of attention as many of those that were
heard.
Finally, there are cases where the Court might find significant
issues inherent in a petition. Biltjinitis v. State ° may have been
such a case. The petitioner in Biltjinitis had pled guilty to burglary
and assault with intent to rape. He then sought a new trial on the
basis of a letter he had received from the victim stating that she had
identified the wrong man. The motion was denied by the trial judge,
who gave no reasons for his decision.81 The Court of Special Appeals
affirmed, noting that the trial judge's decision on the motion was
discretionary and that it saw no reason to overturn his exercise of
discretion.8 2 The petition for certiorari argued that the trial judge
had abused his discretion, but did not raise the issue of how any
court could discover such an abuse in the absence of stated reasons
for the denial by the trial judge. Implicit in the case, therefore, is the
question of whether trial judges should be required to state their
reasons for denying a new trial in an effort to make them
accountable to litigants and the public for their actions. Because the
Court has not indicated any interest in examining this question, it is
unlikely to be raised in a petition. In reviewing petitions, the Court
should be alert for problems litigants have not been encouraged to
raise that it may wish to consider.
This examination of cases where certiorari has been denied
indicates that, at least in the sample studied, the Court of Appeals
has generally been exercising excellent judgment in selecting
worthwhile cases from among the certiorari petitions; in none of the
cases discussed in this section was the refusal of the Court to hear
the case unquestionably wrong. The questions raised with regard to
particular cases demonstrate the desirability of articulating clear
standards for granting certiorari, and help to flesh out the desired
content of those standards when elaborated.
80. Biltjinitis v. State, No. 234 (Court of Appeals, Sept. 8, 1975).
81. According to the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals, the trial judge
simply stated that the victim was "in error," and that "[t]here were a number of
circumstances . . . which convince the Court of the guilt of the defendant beyond a
reasonable doubt." Biltjinitis v. State, No. 1048 (Court of Special Appeals, June 6,
1975), at 5.
82. Id. The court quoted from Carlile v. Two Guys From Harrison, Glen Burnie,
Inc., 264 Md. 475, 287 A.2d 31 (1972).
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2. The Cases Taken.
Surprisingly, the Court of Appeals granted review in a number
of cases where it is difficult to see any reason for doing so. Most of
those cases reached the Court without prior decision by the Court of
Special Appeals; they will be discussed in the next section. Of the
cases that reached the Court of Appeals after a decision by the Court
of Special Appeals, the grant of certiorari was questionable in only a
few cases. The clearest example is Rofra, Inc. v. Board of Education
of Prince George's County,8 3 where the only question was whether a
bid which conformed to an invitation from a school board was an
effective "acceptance." The Court of Special Appeals quickly and
properly disposed of the problem, and the Court of Appeals adopted
that opinion as its own. A simple hornbook issue84 decided correctly
below raises neither "public" nor "private" questions which require
the attention of the Court of Appeals. The same could be said of
Garland v. Hill, 5 where the Court of Appeals, affirming both courts
below, decided that the amount realized on a mortgage foreclosure
was not so low as to "shock the conscience" of the Court and prevent
ratification of the sale. Again, the legal issue was neither novel nor
difficult: the application of those principles to the facts was easily
done and the courts below, without any real question, had done so
correctly.
There is of course nothing wrong in the Court's taking such
cases. To the extent, however, that the time spent on cases of less
significance interferes with time needed for writing, research and
reflection in more important cases, the practice is objectionable.
3. By-Passing The Court Of Special Appeals.
a. Effect on Decision-Making.
Table II in Appendix A lists the manner in which cases came to
the Court of Appeals. Although almost all cases were heard by grant
of certiorari, a remarkable number of the cases decided by the Court
of Appeals did not first go through the Court of Special Appeals,
even though that Court had jurisdiction to hear the case. Approxi-
mately forty-three percent of the decisions made by the Court of
Appeals during the Term fell into this category. The Court's practice
of bypassing the Court of Special Appeals in this fashion is
questionable, for taking such cases may adversely affect the
83. 278 Md. 102, 358 A.2d 562 (1976), aff'g 28 Md. App. 538, 346 A.2d 458 (1975).
84. The Court of Special Appeals relied on S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1957)
and a more obscure work, W. BRANTLY, LAW OF CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1912).
85. 277 Md. 710, 357 A.2d 374 (1976).
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decision-making of the Court of Appeals in several ways. The
primary role of the Court of Appeals is to supervise and direct the
development of the law of the State; the Court of Special Appeals
was created, as discussed earlier, to ensure that the workload of the
Court of Appeals would be light enough to permit it to do so properly.
Later, the Court of Appeals was given complete control of its docket
by limiting its jurisdiction to certiorari only) in a further effort to
permit the Court to perform its tasks as effectively as possible. The
time spent on "bypass" cases makes it more difficult for the Court to
fill this role. Indeed, many of these cases - a percentage
substantially higher than in the cases that did come through the
Court of Special Appeals - did not even belong in the Court of
Appeals, for they raise no serious "institutional" questions. 86 After
reviewing such cases the Court of Appeals necessarily has less time
available to spend on the other cases it takes, or to hear additional
cases where review has been sought. In either event, the ability of
the Court to guide and develop the law of the State has been
hindered.
Bypassing the Court of Special Appeals also deprives the Court
of Appeals of the "screening" role played by the intermediate court.
Screening saves a higher court's time and energy and thereby helps
to maintain the quality of the higher court's over-all performance.8 7
A more subtle effect, but perhaps one of greater importance, is the
effect that screening may have on the quality of decision-making in
individual cases. The opinion of the intermediate court, by eliminat-
ing unimportant issues from the case, focuses the attention of the
86. Three examples should be sufficient. The first, Dietz v. Moore, 277 Md. 1, 351
A.2d 428 (1976), involved a will contest in which routine questions of summary
judgment, admission of hearsay testimony, and scope of examination of witnesses
were involved. The second example is Mayor of Baltimore v. Crane, 277 Md. 198, 352
A.2d 786 (1976), a rather dull and uninteresting zoning case. Third is Zion Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. State Hwy. Admin., 276 Md. 630, 350 A.2d 125 (1976), involving
an allegation that the defendant had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in finishing
the Baltimore Beltway. For each of these cases Justice Stewart's remark in Butz v.
Glover Livestock Comm'n Co., 411 U.S. 182, 189 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting) is
appropriate:
The only remarkable thing about this case is its presence in this Court.
For the case involves no more than the application of well settled principles to
a familiar situation, and has little significance except for the respondent. Why
certiorari was granted is a mystery to me - particularly at a time when the
Court is thought by many to be burdened by too heavy a caseload.
87. In at least one case which bypassed the Court of Special Appeals, the Court of
Appeals was forced to raise, sua sponte, an issue which required reargument. It is
likely that such a need would not have arisen if the case had gone through the Court
of Special Appeals. Gordon v. Comm'rs of St. Michaels, 278 Md. 128, 359 A.2d 543
(1976).
[VOL. 37
THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
litigants and reviewing courts on the more significant issues that
remain.88 Furthermore, the lower court opinion can act as a
catalyst,89 crystallizing thought by both bench and bar on an issue
by providing a basis for the attack (or defense) of an attempted
resolution of a legal problem. 90 In a very real sense, therefore, prior
review by the Court of Special Appeals assists the Court of Appeals
in its own decision-making. 91
b. Exigencies.
Despite the virtues of the intermediate court, there are times
when it may be wise to bypass it. This would be true if it were
necessary to give prompt guidance on an issue which has not been
"previously considered by the Maryland appellate courts. ' 92 The
Court should be reluctant to "jump" a case, however, except in
extraordinary circumstances and under guidelines established in
advance;93 respect for the virtues of prior review by the Court of
Special Appeals should persuade the Court of Appeals to limit the
number of expedited appeals.
In any event, there were few cases decided during the 1975 Term
where the bypass was justified. In several cases, however, a need for
quick review, based on the exigencies of the particular cases, could
have been legitimately asserted. An example is Anne Arundel
County v. McDonough,94 involving a challenge to the sufficiency of
88. This is especially helpful when the reviewing court limits, as the Court of
Appeals sometimes does, the questions on which it wishes to hear argument.
89. Given the quality of the briefs in some cases, the aid provided by the Court of
Special Appeals in doing its own research may prove invaluable to the Court of
Appeals. An extreme example is provided by Johanna Farms, Inc. v. Elliott
Equipment Co., 278 Md. 137, 360 A.2d 436 (1976), where the appellee filed no brief.
Since courts in our adversarial system are to a large extent dependent upon the
research and arguments of counsel, the absence of a brief could have a serious adverse
impact upon the quality of a decision made by the Court.
90. Until recently, certain appeals in the federal system went directly to the
Supreme Court without having first gone to one of the circuit courts of appeal. In
expressing dissatisfaction with this procedure the Supreme Court has emphasized the
importance of the screening function of the intermediate courts. See, e.g., Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 937 (1952) (mem. opinion of Burton &
Frankfurter, JJ., concurring). Congress has recently eliminated most of those cases
from the workload of the Supreme Court.
91. Perhaps in tacit recognition of this point, the Court of Appeals heard only a
very few criminal cases in advance of judgment in the Court of Special Appeals.
92. Thomas v. State, 277 Md. 314, 316, 353 A.2d 256, 257 (1976).
93. The Supreme Court, for example, rarely grants review in such situations.
Supreme Court Rule 20 states that such a writ "will be granted only upon a showing
that the case is of such imperative public importance as to justify the deviation from
normal appellate processes ... " See generally R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, supra note
55, at 183-84.
94. 277 Md. 271, 354 A.2d 788 (1976).
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the ballot description of a zoning referendum in Anne Arundel
County in 1974. If the case had been heard first in the Court of
Special Appeals, final resolution would have been delayed several
months. Because a large amount of property was involved,95 that
delay might have had a serious commercial impact. Furthermore, a
case involving an election issue has some claim of priority in an
election year. On the other hand, a year and a half had already
elapsed since the referendum in question, and additional delay
might not have been too costly in order to obtain a "better" decision
on an issue of importance. 96
Another example of a bypass case where the importance and
urgency of an issue could be thought to justify the decision to bypass
is Barry Properties, Inc. v. Fick Bros. Roofing Co. 97 where the Court
held the granting of a mechanic's lien without prior notice or
hearing invalid under the United States Constitution. Expedition of
the final decision in Barry Properties was justified by the large-scale
use of such liens in the state and the need to settle their validity,
which had been called into question by the decision of the trial
court.
9 8
A different type of case where a decision to expedite a case rests
on the urgency of the situation is illustrated by Wakefield v. Little
Light.99 The dispute in that case centered on the custody of a young
Indian child. That question depended, in turn, on resolution of a
difficult jurisdictional issue. A decision to bypass the Court of
Special Appeals could be justified on the ground that quick
resolution of the dispute was essential to minimize the impact on the
child. Although the urgency of the problem in Wakefield involved
the "private" role of the Court, the workload of the Court was light
enough to permit it to advance the case in order to decide quickly
and finally the struggle over the child.1°0
95. The referendum concerned amendments to the zoning plan for 42 tracts of
land located on, or in the vicinity of, Maryland Route 3.
96. A vigorous dissent was issued by Judge Levine, and joined in by Chief Judge
Murphy. Another election case where quick review could be justified was Steimel v.
Board of Election Supervisors, 278 Md. 1, 357 A.2d 386 (1976) (repeal of county blue
laws by General Assembly subject to local referendum).
97. 277 Md. 15, 353 A.2d 222 (1976).
98. Other cases involving issues arguably in need of quick and authoritative
resolution were Murphy v. Yates, 276 Md. 475, 348 A.2d 837 (1975) (holding
unconstitutional the newly created post of State Prosecutor), and Blue Cross of Md.,
Inc. v. Franklin Square Hosp., 277 Md. 93, 352 A.2d 798 (1976) (dealing with a number
of questions concerning the Health Services Cost Review Commission).
99. 276 Md. 333, 347 A.2d 228 (1975).
100. While the issue in Wakefield was a "public" one (the relationship between
tribal and state courts), the decision to expedite the case - if done for the reason
suggested in the text - was "private," for it touched only the parties to the case.
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A final situation in which a decision to bypass the Court of
Special Appeals might be justified is where there has been a conflict
on the pertinent issue between two or more panels of the Court of
Special Appeals. In that situation, a decision in the case at bar by
still another panel would not resolve the underlying legal problem,
for this is only something the supervisory court - that is, the Court
of Appeals - can do. Apparently only one case decided during the
1975 Term raised this problem in any significant way.101
In short, there are situations where it is possible to argue with
some force that the Court of Appeals was justified in expediting a
case. It is impossible to tell, however, whether the presence of a
Court of Special Appeals decision on which to focus would have
enabled the Court of Appeals to avoid errors in particular cases, or to
write opinion which would provide better guides for the orderly
development of the law of the State. In any event, cases in which
there was even a colorable justification for the decision to bypass the
Court of Special Appeals formed a small percentage of the total
number of bypass cases. As for the remainder, the Court of Appeals
should not have removed them from the normal appellate process.
Why, then, did the Court of Appeals take so many cases out of
turn? The most plausible explanation for the large number of cases
jumped by the Court of Appeals is that the Court wished to ease the
workload of the Court of Special Appeals; the Court of Special
Appeals had an extremely heavy caseload and some of the judges on
that Court had suffered serious illnesses during the year. The Court
of Appeals apparently decided that the problems of the intermediate
court outweighed the possible adverse impact on its own caseload
and decision-making. If this be true, it is a situation rich in irony:
the Court of Special Appeals was designed to ease the burden of the
Court of Appeals and yet now the Court of Appeals devotes part of
its docket to easing the burden of the Court of Special Appeals.
If the Court of Appeals is concerned about the burden of the
Court of Special Appeals, there are ways of helping which lessen the
impact on its own operations. Individual members of the Court, for
example, could have been assigned to hear cases in the Court of
Special Appeals. Because the Court of Appeals regularly sits in
panels of at least five,102 while the Court of Special Appeals normally
sits in three-judge panels, this would have been a more efficient
101. Davis v. State, 278 Md. 103, 361 A.2d 113 (1976), where the decision of the
Court of Special Appeals was arguably inconsistent with other decisions of that court.
102. The Court of Appeals cannot effectively reduce the size of its panels; the
constitutional quorum is five judges. MD. CONST. art. IV, § 14.
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response. 10 3 This solution, however, is deficient in two respects: first,
there may be a reluctance on the part of judges of inferior courts to
contradict a superior in the judicial hierarchy; 10 4 and second, there is
a possibility that participants in the legal system will treat an
opinion written by a Court of Appeals judge sitting on the Court of
Special Appeals as having more precedential value than a "regular"
Court of Special Appeals opinion.10 5 Another way of easing the Court
of Special Appeals' burden would be to assign some of the many
excellent trial court judges in the state to sit specially on the Court of
Special Appeals. 0 6 While this solution does not eliminate the
"deference" problem, it does carry the advantage of exposing trial
judges to the problems faced by a reviewing court (and vice versa).
That exposure may well make better judges out of each group.
Another possible solution, of course, if the workload of the Court of
Special Appeals is a permanent problem, is to increase the number of
judges who sit on that court. This presents problems of its own,10 7
however, and, in any event, is beyond the power of the Court of
Appeals to handle administratively.
4. Other Certiorari Cases.
Almost all of the cases - 103 of 109, or ninety-three percent -
which reached the Court of Appeals by certiorari were cases that
either had been heard or could have been heard in the Court of
Special Appeals.' The remainder of the petitions for certiorari were
in cases which originated in a district court and were then appealed
103. The Court of Appeals began doing this with some frequency in the summer of
1976. See, e.g., Millison v. Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene, 32 Md. App. 165,
359 A.2d 247 (1976) (per Singley, J.).
104. Note, for example, the very small number of separate opinions of the Court of
Appeals authored or joined in by specially assigned judges. See note 124 infra.
105. This could take the form of reluctance on the part of the Court of Appeals to
overturn an opinion by one of its members who sat specially below.
106. The Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals is authorized to assign a judge of any
court (other than the Orphans' Court) to sit on any other court. MD. CONST. art. IV,
§ 18A.
107. The Court of Special Appeals has thirteen judges at present. While that court
appears to be a very effective and capable body, there seems to be fairly general
agreement that a court much larger than seven or nine members cannot function
effectively as a court, functioning instead as a collection of judges. See, e.g.,
Leventhal, Appellate Procedures: Design, Patchwork, and Managed Flexibility, 23
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 432 (1976). Because the Court of Special Appeals has been a
successful court, there should be some reluctance to work fundamental changes in its
structure. There are of course a myriad of other possible solutions. See, e.g., Lesinski &
Stockmeyer, Prehearing Research and Screening in the Michigan Court of Appeals:
One Court's Method for Increasing Judicial Productivity, 26 VAND. L. REV. 1211
(1973).
108. See Appendix A, Table II infra.
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to a circuit court. That court's decision is the end of the road for
those cases unless the Court of Appeals grants, as it did in these
cases, the petition for certiorari. 10 9
III. Other Roads To The Court
A. Appeals.
A direct appeal to the Court of Appeals from a nisi prius decision
is no longer possible. There were, however, six cases decided by the
Court of Appeals during the study period which had been docketed
as "appeals" in the Court prior to January 1, 1975, the effective date
of the statute terminating this method of reaching the Court.110
These were all routine cases. Indeed, the trivial nature of the issues
presented in some of them confirms the wisdom of the General
Assembly in abolishing this form of jurisdiction."'
In addition to appeals from trial court decisions, the Court of
Appeals heard one case that came to it by a statutory appeal from a
decision of the Maryland Tax Court." 2 The Court of Appeals there
held that the General Assembly could not provide for an "appeal" to
it directly from the Tax Court because under the Maryland
Constitution the Court of Appeals, an "appellate court," could only
hear matters that had first been decided by a "court." Since the Tax
Court was found to be an administrative agency, no appeal would lie
from that body. Thus, this method of reaching the Court is no longer
available to litigants.
B. Certified Questions.
The Court of Appeals issued opinions in only two cases in which
questions were certified to it by another court. Both cases came from
United States district courts, one from Maryland," 3 and the other
from the District of Columbia."14 Both cases involved questions
which were open under Maryland law, and in both cases the Court of
Appeals gave more than adequate guidance to the certifying
courts. 1 5 Indeed, in one case the Court, after answering the certified
109. See note 12 supra.
110. See note 17 supra.
111. See, e.g., Kapiloff v. Locke, 276 Md. 466, 348 A.2d 697 (1975) (hearsay
problem).
112. Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor of Assessments, 276 Md. 36, 343 A.2d 521 (1975).
113. Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 359 A.2d 548 (1976).
114. Holtze v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 276 Md. 681, 351 A.2d 139 (1976).
115. The Court of Appeals has not commented on the constitutionality of the
certified question procedure. Other states which have adopted the Uniform Act have
had little difficulty in finding the procedure constitutional. See, e.g., In re Richards,
223 A.2d 827 (Me. 1966).
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questions, made some "additional observations" with respect to
issues that might arise on trial of the case.116 Because the certified
question route is a convenient way for an "outside" court to be given
authoritative guidance with respect to questions of Maryland law, it
is surprising that greater use has not been made of the practice. 1" 7
The paucity of certified questions may merely reflect unfamiliar-
ity with the practice. It may also reflect dislike of the practice by
bench and bar, owing to the delay, extra effort, and expense that it
will generally entail."18 A judge may also be reluctant to certify a
question because of an unwillingness to let the development of the
law "escape" his control.
It is difficult to tell whether any of these factors are responsible
for the low number of questions certified to the Court of Appeals. A
search through the Federal Supplements issued during the study
period for published opinions by the United States District Court for
the District of Maryland (the court most likely to be faced with
substantial questions regarding Maryland law) failed to turn up any
cases in which Maryland law was both unsettled and a significant
aspect of the case. 1 9 When such problems do arise in the future it is
to be hoped that bench and bar will make use of the certified
question route.
C. Professional Supervision.
The Court of Appeals issued opinions in five cases in which a
panel of judges had recommended discipline of a member of the bar.
In four of these the Court issued unanimous opinions; in all five
116. Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 171, 359 A.2d 548, 555 (1976). These observations
were probably prompted by the necessary incompleteness of the record certified to the
Court of Appeals.
117. The certified question route does sometimes make things difficult for the
Court of Appeals. In Mercantile-Safe Dep. & Trust Co. v. Purifoy, 280 Md. 46, 371 A.2d
650 (1977), for example, the Court was asked to construe a provision of the Maryland
adoption statute. The majority did so, but expressly avoided any consideration of the
constitutionality of the construction placed on the Act - a position rejected in a
dissenting opinion.
118. Certification requires: 1) briefing the certifying court on the need to certify; 2)
briefing the Court of Appeals on the question certified; 3) briefing the certifying court
on the application of the decision by the Court of Appeals. Without certification these
steps could be compressed into one. On the other hand, the certified question route is
analogous to an interlocutory appeal, a procedure which does have the potential for
saving the parties, in the proper circumstances, both time and money.
119. But see Patterson v. Ramsey, 413 F. Supp. 523, 523 n.1 (D. Md. 1976) where
Judge Young noted that he had not certified an open question of Maryland law
because of the possibility of delay, and because resolution of the issue appeared to him
to be "straightforward."
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cases the Court disciplined the attorney in question: there were two
reprimands, two suspensions (one of thirty days and one of one
year), and one disbarment.
In addition, the Court decided a significant professional
supervision issue, avoiding federal constitutional problems in so
doing, when it ruled that an applicant who had been conditionally
admitted to the bar need not maintain an office in the state for a
year in order to be fully admitted to practice. 12°
SECTION Two: THE WORK OF THE COURT
I. The Weight Of The Work
A. Published Opinions.
Table IV shows the distribution of authorship of published
opinions among the judges during the study period. The judges
averaged about seventeen published opinions; for the six judges who
sat during the whole year, the average was approximately eighteen
per judge. The writing of the opinions of the Court was spread out in
rather uneven fashion among the members of the Court; Judge
Singley, for example, authored half again as many opinions for the
Court as Judge Digges. While the differences among the judges
narrow when the total number of opinions written is taken into
consideration, differences are still substantial. Although it is
possible that this uneven opinion load results from a practice of not
assigning "difficult" opinions to a particular judge, an examination
of the cases does not seem to bear out this hypothesis. Several other
factors may account, however, for the disparity: illness, other official
responsibilities, 121 or, perhaps, campaigning for re-election.
The members of the Court of Appeals were helped to some extent
by a number of other judges who sat by designation 122 on the Court
during the year. The impact of those judges on the Court's decision-
making was apparently slight;123 none wrote either a majority or
120. In re Day, 276 Md. 204, 345 A.2d 434 (1975). The petitioner in Day had
challenged the requirement that a conditional admittee to the Maryland Bar maintain
an office and practice in the state. Rules Governing Admission to the Bar, Rule 14 et
seq. The Court neatly sidestepped the problem by deleting the requirement from the
Rules.
121. The Chief Judge, for example, has numerous administrative responsibilities.
See, e.g., MD. CONST., art. IV, § 18A.
122. See MD. CONST. art. IV, § 18A.
123. It is, however, impossible to know the influence of any judge in conference, or
in comments that may be made with respect to proposed opinions.
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dissenting opinion,124 and in only two cases did the vote of the
special judge affect the outcome.1 25
In comparative terms, the workload of the Court of Appeals does
not appear to be unduly heavy. In 1957, for example, the five judges
then on the Court issued an average of forty-five opinions each; in
1952 they had written twenty-six and one-half each. 1 26 Indeed, the
number of opinions written during the 1975 Term is dramatically
smaller than it has been in recent years.1 27 Data from other courts
also support the conclusion that the Court of Appeals is not, at least
in comparative terms, so burdened by its caseload that it is not
capable of turning out high quality opinions. 128
B. Other Burdens.
The work of the Court is not limited to its reported decisions. For
example, the Court has responsibility for adoption and modification
of the Maryland Rules of Procedure. 129 Some portion of the Court's
time is also devoted to work that is less visible because it is not
reported. The greatest part of this invisible workload involves the
certiorari process. During the 1975-1976 Fiscal Year, the Court was
presented with 464 petitions for certiorari, of which 104 - about
twenty-two percent -. were granted.130 The effort required to prepare
124. However, in Kapiloff v. Locke, 276 Md. 466, 348 A.2d 697 (1975), Chief Judge
Orth of the Court of Special Appeals, joined in a dissent authored by Judge Smith,
and in State v. Williams, 278 Md. 180, 361 A.2d 122 (1976), Judge Grady of the
Supreme Bench of Baltimore City joined another dissent by Judge Smith.
125. Winterwerp v. Allstate Ins. Co., 277 Md. 714, 357 A.2d 350 (1976) (4-3 decision;
Judge Powers of the Court of Special Appeals voting with majority); Murphy v. Yates,
276 Md. 475, 348 A.2d 837 (1975) (result would have have been different if both special
judges had switched their votes).
126. ENEY REPORT, supra note 18, at 413. Between 1935 and 1939 each judge on the
Court wrote an average of 17.6 opinions per year. Brune & Strahorn, supra note 4, at
363. Those judges, however, also had significant nisi prius responsibilities. Id. at 356.
127. See RUSSELL REPORT, supra note 23, at 16.
128. See, e.g., Beatty, Decision-Making on the Iowa Supreme Court - 1965-1969, 19
DRAKE L. REV. 342, 349 (1969) (average of 31 opinions per judge during late 1960's);
Merryman, The Authority of Authority, 6 STAN. L. REV. 613, 652 (1954) (in 1950 the
seven members of the California Supreme Court averaged over 29 opinions each);
Wolfram, Notes From a Study of the Caseload of the Minnesota Supreme Court: Some
Comments and Statistics on Pressures and Responses, 53 MINN. L. REV. 939, 939
(1969) (in 1968 an average of about 44 decisions by each of seven judges). See also
ALDISERT, supra note 2, at 817, noting that in 1974 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
wrote 45 opinions per judge, as did the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
The accuracy of a comparison of judicial workloads based on opinions issued
depends on the comparability of difficulty of cases reviewed (among other factors). It
is, nevertheless, a fairly good indicator of the pressure placed on a court by its
caseload.
129. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1-201 (1974).
130. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, ANN. REP., 1975-1976, at 65.
[VOL. 37
THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
each member of the Court to make a decision on those petitions adds
a significant burden to the workload of the Court.
During the study period the Court also issued opinions in nine
unreported cases.' 3 ' In none of these cases was the Court's decision
to refrain from publication questionable, at least given the decision
to provide for unpublished opinions, for all apparently involved
either problems unique to the case at bar or the application of well-
settled rules.
The Court also made a number of miscellaneous decisions
during the Term. These included the dismissal of petitions for
certiorari as having been improvidently granted, dismissal on the
basis of mootness, the denial of several petitions for a writ of
mandamus, and the transfer of cases to other courts.
While all of these actions added to the burdens on the Court,
they do not appear large enough to impair its ability to function
effectively, nor do they appear to be of such character as to alter the
conclusion that, in comparative terms, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland is not overworked. To this extent, at least, the designs of
the blue-ribbon committees that have acted over the past two
decades have been realized.
II. The Opinions
This sub-section 132 discusses the origins of the cases heard by
the Court during the Term, then focuses on the Court's practice with
respect to separate opinions, and concludes with an analysis of the
substantive content of the opinions.
A. Source.
1. Geographic.
The Court, as shown in Table III, heard cases from all but five of
the Maryland counties. There is a significant correlation between the
131. An "unreported" opinion of the Court of Appeals "is not a precedent within
the rule of stare decisis .... ." MD. R.P. 891a2 (1977). For a critical review of
unpublished opinions, see Gardner, Ninth Circuit's Unpublished Opinions: Denial of
Equal Justice?, 61 A.B.A.J. 1224 (1975).
132. Most readers will undoubtedly find much of the following material dull. The
data and discussion are included in part to serve as a reference for future inquiries
and in part because the absence of interesting data can be as significant as its
presence. See A. DOYLE, THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES (1905):
"[T]he curious incident of the dog in the nighttime."
"The dog did nothing in the nighttime."




number of cases heard and the population of the county. The only
exceptions are Calvert and Talbot counties, but because the number
of cases involved is so small these data do not appear to be
significant enough to alter the conclusion that the geographic origin
of a case is not a factor in the decision whether to review it.133
2. Courts.
a. Circuit Courts.
Similarly, the Court of Appeals did not appear to be signifi-
cantly influenced in its selection process by the identity of the trial
judge. No trial judge had a large number of cases heard by the Court
during the Term, nor did any suffer a disproportionately high rate of
reversal.
b. Court of Special Appeals.
The fate of the cases heard by the Court of Appeals that came to
it from the Court of Special Appeals is shown in Table V. Again, it is
difficult to glean much from the data. It is somewhat surprising
that almost three-fifths of the authored Court of Special Appeals
opinions were affirmed, since it might be expected that the cases
taken for review were among the more troublesome ones decided by
the Court of Special Appeals. 134 The preponderance of affirmances
further supports the earlier observation that the Court of Appeals is
perhaps not as selective in choosing cases to review as it might be.135
No member of the Court of Special Appeals had a disproportion-
ately high rate of reversal.1 3 6 While some judges participated in a
significantly greater number of decisions that were reviewed than
did others, this may have been due to factors other than a lack of
confidence in the writers of the opinions: illness, for example, or
quirks in the data.
A comparison of the percentage affirmed figure of Tables V-A
and V-B does lead to one interesting conclusion. Those figures
indicate that a reviewed per curiam Court of Special Appeals
decision is nearly three times as likely to be reversed as is a signed
133. Brune & Strahorn, supra note 4, found that over 61% of the Court's caseload
between 1935-1939 originated in Baltimore City. Id. at 366. In 1975-1976 it accounted
for only 15.7% of the cases. See Table VIII infra. The change reflects in large part the
decline of Baltimore City as the population center of the State.
134. If so, the low number of dissents in the Court of Special Appeals in these cases
is somewhat surprising.
135. See text accompanying notes 85 to 87 supra.
136. The panels on which Judges Davidson, Menchine and Powers sat, however,
did have an unusually high rate of affirmance.
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opinion from that court. Several explanations for this disparity are
possible. First and simplest, the number of reviewed per curiam
decisions is too small to permit any valid inference to be drawn.
Second, a per curiam opinion, because it is unsigned, unpublished,
and does not have precedential value, 137 is more likely to be "wrong"
(in the view of the Court of Appeals) for the simple reason that it is
not prepared as carefully and thoughtfully as an opinion that will be
published, designed to serve as precedent, and which bears the
author's name. Lesser care in the preparation of a per curiam
opinion would seem a real possibility on a heavily burdened court.
The disparity in numbers of reviewed per curiam and published
opinions may also be a function of the attitude of the Court of
Appeals towards precedent. Thus, the Court of Appeals might be
generally less interested in per curiam Court of Special Appeals
opinions because they have not been published and cannot,
therefore, be used as precedent. Review, therefore, would serve to
correct error only in the case at bar and not to correct error in
doctrine. On the other hand, it might be thought desirable at times to
review a published opinion of the Court of Special Appeals - even if
it appears "correct" - in order to put the imprimatur of the Court on
the precedent that has been established.
B. Dissent On The Court Of Appeals.
Separate opinions (dissents and concurrences) serve a number of
purposes. Because dissenters 138 are not limited by concessions often
necessary to secure a majority on the primary issue, their opinions
can illuminate issues slighted by the majority. For the same reason,
dissenters have greater freedom to engage in extended discussion on
limited points, helping to isolate vital issues and bring them to the
attention of the public. "A dissent in a court of last resort," Chief
Justice Stone once noted, "is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the
law, to the intelligence of a future day ... ."139 Thus, a later court,
faced with a similar problem, may find the dissent useful in
137. See MD. R.P. 1092(c) (1977).
138. Concurring opinions do not differ analytically from dissenting opinions; in
each the opinion is generally of the form "I do not agree with the reasoning of the
majority .... ." An example is provided by Judge Smith's concurring opinion in
Dillon v. State, 277 Md. 571, 357 A.2d 360 (1976). In that opinion Judge Smith agreed
with the substantive position taken by the dissent, but voted to affirm appellant's
conviction on the ground that the error in the trial court was harmless.
139. C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 68 (1928). See
generally P. JACKSON, DISSENT IN THE SUPREME COURT (1969); ZoBell, Division of




understanding difficulties in the positions taken in the majority
opinion; that understanding may serve to limit (or increase) the
impact of the earlier precedent in later cases. 140 In turn, the threat of
a stinging dissent may force the writer of the majority opinion to
analyze more clearly and effectively the problem before him. The
threat of a dissent may also restrain the "judicial advocate" from
overstating his case, for the readiness of the potential dissenter "to
pounce upon what he believes to be majority suppression or
distortion of fact or exaggeration of legal doctrine renders these
things less likely to occur."' 14  Finally, dissents signal - and
perhaps help trigger - intellectual ferment among the members of
the Court. I42 Because dissenting opinions serve a variety of healthy
functions, their absence might be a worrisome sign.
On the other hand, there are several valid reasons why the
number of dissents may not accurately reflect the level of disagree-
ment among the members of the Court. In the first place, as Justice
Walter Schaefer has observed, "there may be disagreement without
dissent."'14 3 A judge will write a separate opinion only if his
"fighting conviction"'144 has been stirred. But a judge must be careful
not to jeopardize his relations with his colleagues by the too frequent
or pointless use of dissents. He must also be aware of the fragile
value of separate opinions which, like the little boy's cry of "wolf," if
used too often may lose their special value and no longer signal to
bench and bar that this is an issue worthy of special attention. 45 To
preserve the special value of his separate opinions a judge must ask
himself "whether it is likely to serve the law by extracting from the
shadows the problems left unstated and the theories that should
eventually control." 146
It is, of course, very difficult for an outsider to ascertain if either
- or both - of these problems afflict the Court of Appeals. During
140. See Miller, supra note 3, at 12, 14.
141. Stephens, The Function of Concurring and Dissenting Opinions in Courts of
Last Resort, 5 U. FLA. L. REV. 394, 403 (1952).
142. Cf. THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 170 (D.
Danelski & J. Tulchia eds. 1973) ("Justice Harlan was disturbed by the serenity of the
Court and complained to me that there were too few dissents.").
143. Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 3/8 (1966).
144. Id. at 9.
145. Chief Justice Stone's remark on this point in a letter he wrote to Karl
Llewellyn is telling: "[I]f I should write in every case where I do not agree with some
of the views expressed in the opinions, you and all my other friends would stop
reading them." Quoted in W. MURPHY, THE ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 62
(1964).
146. Traynor, Some Open Questions on the Work of State Appellate Courts, 24 U.
CHI. L. REV. 211, 218 (1957).
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the study period separate opinions were relatively rare. Approxi-
mately three-fourths of the Court's opinions during that span, as
shown in Table VI, were unanimous. In only thirty-one cases were
separate opinions issued - a total of twenty-five dissents and seven
concurrences, or an average of 4.2 per judge. Indicative of the high
degree of cohesion on the Court is the fact that only one plurality
decision was handed down during the Term;147 only once, that is, did
the judges fail to agree on an opinion that could be approved by a
majority of the Court.
Comparative data on the frequency of separate opinions are
rare148 and, in any event, would reveal little absent a detailed
analysis of the decisions made in those cases. Thus, while a great
deal of data concerning the separate opinions of the Supreme Court
of the United States is available,149 it is of little comparative use
with respect to state appellate courts such as the Court of Appeals.
Not only do state courts have a lighter caseload, and thus more time
to work out collegial differences, 50 but the issues presented to such
courts are generally less volatile and controversial than those
presented to the Supreme Court. By their very nature, therefore, they
are less likely to provoke an "appeal to the bar of history" in the
form of a separate opinion. 15 1
147. Dillon v. State, 277 Md. 571, 357 A.2d 360 (1976). The lead opinion was
authored by Judge O'Donnell and joined in by Judges Murphy, Singley and Digges;
Judge Smith issued a separate opinion and Judge Levine wrote a dissent that was
joined by Judge Eldridge. Judge O'Donnell died, however, before his opinion had been
adopted by the Court; thus, his opinion commanded the assent of only three of the six
voting judges, making it a plurality opinion, as Judge Levine noted. Id. at 588, 357
A.2d at 371.
Fortunately, the factual situation in Dillon is unlikely to recur, and the
plurality decision should not cause trouble similar to that which has plagued the
Supreme Court in this area. See generally Davis & Reynolds, Juridical Cripples:
Plurality Opinions in the Supreme Court, 1974 DUKE L.J. 59.
148. Available figures indicate that the percentage of non-unanimous cases is
rather high for a state court of last resort. According to Willis, supra note 3, at 513, the
percentage of non-unanimous opinions in state supreme courts in recent years was
5.4% (Kentucky) and 9.7% (Iowa). See also Miller, supra note 3, at 12, for data on the
Michigan Supreme Court a decade ago: approximately 73% of the cases decided by
that court were unanimous. During the 1935-1939 period, members of the Court of
Appeals issued an average of 2.5 dissents each year per judge. Brune & Strahorn,
supra note 4, at 362.
149. Each year, the Harvard Law Review publishes in its Supreme Court issue
data on the opinions of the Supreme Court. In the October, 1974 Term only 24.8% of
the 137 "Full Opinions" handed down were unanimous. The Supreme Court, 1974
Term, 89 HARV. L. REV. 11, 277 (1975).
150. But see text accompanying notes 26 to 28 supra.
151. See Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: Past and Present, 59 A.B.A.J. 361, 363
(1973): "It may well be that the nature of constitutional adjudication invites, at least,




Analysis of the separate opinions of the Court of Appeals
indicates they were not undertaken frivolously or lightly. Almost all
raise serious questions with respect to the law declared by the
majority opinion, or with the application of that law to the facts in
the case at bar. In only a few cases did dissident judges engage in
the questionable practice of not expressing the ground of disagree-
ment.1 5 2 Rarely did a separate opinion focus primarily on a review of
the evidence presented below,' s 3 nor were separate opinions often
used by a judge to "decide" (for himself, at least) an issue that would
probably be raised in the trial court on remand.15 4 In short, there is
little evidence of overindulgence in the freedom of dissent. 55
Whether members of the Court stayed their hand too often with
regard to writing separate opinions is a more difficult question.
While it is surprising, for example, that the wholesale revision of the
common law of defamation in Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf15 6 was
unanimous, this does not seem to indicate malaise on the part of the
Court. There are several reasons why there is no cause for alarm.
First, much of the Court's caseload involves areas of relatively well-
settled law (negligence, for example), and disagreement among the
judges, if any, centers on "non-institutional" questions such as
evaluation of a set of facts in the light of well-settled legal principles.
Decisions in such cases, because they are unimportant to anyone
152. See Appendix A, note 7 infra. The dissent without opinion is "questionable"
because no guide to the problem is given by the dissenter. See Miller, supra note 3, at
12, 14.
153. But see Fleming v. Prince George's County, 277 Md. 655, 686, 358 A.2d 892,
908 (1976) (Murphy, C.J., dissenting).
154. But see Taylor v. Armiger, 277 Md. 638, 653, 358 A.2d 883, 891 (1976) (Murphy,
C.J., concurring). In Taylor, the five year-old plaintiff, riding a tricycle, "darted out"
into a street from a driveway. The majority held that the jury should have been
permitted to consider whether the child was contributorily negligent, but expressly did
not "decide the question of whether a tricycle was a vehicle within the meaning of the
then existing statute .... " Id. at 639, 358 A.2d at 884. Chief Judge Murphy's
concurrence does decide that question, in the affirmative.
155. It is unusual for a member of the Court to preserve his dissent by reiterating
his position the next time that issue arises. Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664, 350 A.2d 680
(1976), and Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 350 A.2d 665 (1976), decided within three
days of one another, provide an example. In Dorsey, the Court held that a test of
"harmless error" should be applied to all errors in a criminal trial whether or not "of
constitutional dimension." Chief Judge Murphy, along with Judges Levine and
Smith, dissented from this part of the holding in Dorsey. In Ross, the majority
opinion applied the harmless error test to a non-constitutional error in a criminal
case, finding that the conviction of the petitioner should be reversed. Chief Judge
Murphy and Judge Levine joined in the majority opinion; Judge Smith dissented, but
on other grounds. But see State v. Williams, 278 Md. 180, 361 A.2d 122 (1976), where
Judge Eldridge dissented on the basis of his earlier dissenting opinion in Williams v.
Director, Patuxent Inst., 276 Md. 272, 347 A.2d 179 (1975).
156. 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976).
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other than the litigants, do not generally involve situations where it
is likely that a separate opinion would be used to bring the problem
to the attention of an outside audience (the bar as a whole, or the
legislature, or the general public) in an effort to chage the result.157
Even if there is disagreement among the judges over legal principles,
relatively minor or non-controversial issues are less likely to bring
forth a separate opinion, for it is less likely that a judge in those
cases will feel strongly enough to preserve his separate opinion as an
"appeal to the bar of history." Hence, it is significant here that only
one-fifth of the Court's cases involved constitutional questions.15
Finally, the sharpness of the dissents that are written belies any
concern that members of the Court pull their punches in the matter
of dissents. The judges who wrote the separate opinions in Barry
Properties'59 or in State v. Fabritz,60 for example, are judges who are
not afraid to speak their minds in the proper circumstances.
C. Congruence Of Opinion.
As noted in the preceding section, there is considerable
agreement among the members of the Court. That conclusion is
borne out by Table VIII, showing the voting alignments among
members of the Court. The lowest degree of cohesion between any
two members (between Judges Murphy and Eldridge) still indicates
agreement in three-quarters of the cases. Furthermore, in eight
out of the twenty-one possible combinations between two members,
the level of agreement exceeded ninety percent. That very high
congruence of opinion helps to confirm the view that much of the
work of the Court is non-controversial. The high level of agreement
also masks the possible existence of voting blocs on the Court;161 at a
guess, the development of blocs, if there be any at all, is retarded by
the lack of any need in the vast majority of cases to develop regular
sources of support.
On the other hand, the data do show a degree of difference with
respect to the persuasiveness of the judges. Table VII measures that
characteristic in terms of the ability of a judge to convince his
brethren of the correctness of his views and to have them join his
157. Put somewhat differently, if the result is unlikely to be changed either
through the intervention of a higher court, or through that of a specific interest group
which is adversely affected by the decision and which can secure legislative change, it
is unlikely that a judge will risk otherwise good relations with his colleagues for the
sake of a -clear statement of his own position.
158. See Table IX, Appendix A, infra.
159. 277 Md. 15, 39, 353 A.2d 222, 236 (1976).
160. 276 Md. 416, 426, 348 A.2d 275, 281 (1975) ("I fear that my distinguished
colleagues may have been swayed by the photographic exhibits . . .
161. See generally W. MURPHY, supra note 145.
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opinion. Four members of the Court had over eighty percent of their
opinions issued unanimously, but the opinions of the other three
fared far less well. This suggests either that the views of these three
were somewhat out of tune with the rest of the Court, or, perhaps, an




Table IX categorizes, according to subject matter, each case
decided by the Court of Appeals during the Term. Because no case is
listed more than once, the categorization presents problems with
classification and over-simplification. 163 This is especially true in
cases which bypassed the Court of Special Appeals; because the
Court of Appeals is the only appellate court to hear the case, it will,
perforce, often hear more than one issue.164 Nevertheless, single
issue classification seemed the best and most effective way to
present the work of the Court.
A. Public Law.
Over half of the opinions of the Court of Appeals involved
questions of public law. Almost one-third of the cases were criminal
or quasi-criminal. 165 The large proportion of the Court's caseload
devoted to those matters reflects, of course, a large volume of
criminal proceedings in the lower courts. More than that, however, it
shows the judicial system's extreme concern for procedural fairness
in criminal cases: thus, almost one-half of the criminal cases
involved questions of constitutional law. 66 Outside of the criminal
162. Judge O'Donnell's record may also be influenced by the fact that, for the
opinions of his that were adopted by the Court after his death, he was unable to
"persuade" others to his point of view.
163. An example is Gordon v. Comm'rs of St. Michaels, 278 Md. 128, 359 A.2d 543
(1976). There, the Court of Appeals was presented with a constitutional challenge to
the zoning power of the town of St. Michaels. The case is classified under "Maryland
Constitutional" for this Article; it could have been listed instead, or in addition, under
"Zoning."
164. Davidson v. Miller, 276 Md. 54, 344 A.2d 422 (1975) is illustrative. The Court in
Davidson held, inter alia: 1) the Maryland automatic removal provision was
unconstitutional under the Federal Constitution, 2) a trial judge may order a
remittitur after granting a new trial, and 3) testimony by an expert witness was
insufficiently probative to be admissible. In Table IX, however, Davidson is listed
only under "United States Constitution," since that was the primary focus of the
opinion of the Court of Appeals.
165. This includes juvenile and defective delinquency proceedings.
166. In contrast, no criminal case reviewed by the Court of Appeals had as the
primary issue the question of sufficient evidence to support the conviction.
Concern for procedural fair play appears to be of relatively recent origin.
Brune & Strahorn, supra note 4, at 350, found that only five percent of the cases
decided between 1935 and 1940 involved "crimes."
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area, only three cases involved substantial questions decided under
the Constitution of the United States.167 This suggests that litigants
in Maryland view the federal bench as more receptive to such
questions than the state bench, and that they take their constitu-
tional claims into the federal system whenever possible. 168 These
data also suggest that litigants believe the Maryland Constitution
will not provide as effective a protection of claimed rights as parallel
provisions of the United States Constitution. All the civil cases
decided on state constitutional grounds, for example, lacked parallel
federal provisions which could have served as an alternative ground
of decision.
Fewer than ten percent of the opinions involved questions of
administrative law. This seems a low figure given the importance
and ubiquity of administrative judgments in the everyday life of the
people and business of Maryland. 169 This paucity of cases is
probably due in part to the deference given administrative judg-
ments and decisions on review, and in part to the absence of parties
with economic interests significant enough to justify the taking of
an appeal.
B. Private Law.
The Court's decisions in the private law area are also revealing.
About one-eighth of the decisions were procedural or evidentiary,
leaving thirty-six cases - approximately thirty percent of the total
heard by the Court - for development of private law. Over half of
these cases involved tort and property questions, with a scattering of
decisions in other areas. The paucity of cases in areas of private
ordering (contract, for example) confirms the observations of others
that businesses do not use the courts in any major way. The reasons
for this are not hard to find: business is interested in orderly
167. Davidson v. Miller, 276 Md. 54, 344 A.2d 422 (1975) (see note 164 supra); Barry
Properties, Inc. v. Fick Bros. Roofing Co., 277 Md. 15, 353 A.2d 222 (1976) (mechanic's
lien statute held unconstitutional absent due process protection). See also Westchester
West No. 2 Ltd. Partnership v. Montgomery County, 276 Md. 448, 348 A.2d 856 (1975)
(constitutionality of county's rent control ordinance). Of course, all cases are decided
within the framework of the U.S. Constitution. Occasionally, this leads to detailed
analysis of Supreme Court opinions in order to determine the latitude left for decision
making by the Court of Appeals. See, e.g., Geelhoed v. Jensen, 277 Md. 220, 352 A.2d
818 (1976) (excellent discussion of due process considerations with respect to the
Maryland long-arm statute).
168. In criminal cases, it is difficult to raise an initial claim of right under the
United States Constitution. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) and its progeny.
Thus, it is difficult to bypass the Court of Appeals in criminal cases.
169. For example, Administrative Appeals constituted 13.6 percent of cases filed in
U.S. Circuit Courts in Fiscal 1976. DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S.
COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT, 155, 165 (1976).
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procedures, in avoiding expensive (and risky) litigation, and in
maintaining stable relationships. 1 70 Thus, those cases involving
private ordering which did come to the Court of Appeals tended to
involve small, one-shot transactions such as the sale of a house-
trailer by a trailer-park owner, 17' or a dispute over mitigation of
damages by a residential landlord. 72 Still, this does not explain the
surprising absence of decisions in areas of labor law 73 (one case) or
business associations (no cases), especially in view of the troubled
economic state of the past half decade. Perhaps the absence of labor
cases can be attributed to the fact that labor law involves a
specialized bar accustomed to practice before a large federal
administrative agency; since collective bargaining agreements have
a federal forum available, 74 the labor bar will take litigation to that
arena simply because it is more familiar territory. It is difficult to
understand, however, why no cases involving business associations
arose during the Term. This is an area regulated by state law where
federal jurisdiction may be difficult to obtain, and where the disputes
that may arise between a stockholder and the board of directors are
seldom avoided for purposes of future harmony. 175
Equally puzzling is the relative absence of civil cases in which
any significant evidentiary questions were raised. 76 Again, this
phenomenon is difficult to explain. It may be that the cases
involving evidentiary problems presented to the Court of Appeals for
review involved decisions where the trial judge articulated the
correct "law" but did not properly apply that law to the factual
setting before him. 77 It is unlikely that such decisions would be
given high priority by the Court of Appeals, since the cases often
170. See generally L. FRIEDMAN, CoNTRAcT LAw IN AMERICA (1965); Macaulay,
Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55
(1963).
171. Lewis v. Hughes, 276 Md. 247, 346 A.2d 231 (1975).
172. Wilson v. Ruhl, 277 Md. 607, 356 A.2d 544 (1976).
173. State courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts to enforce
collective bargaining agreements. Local 714, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S.
95 (1962).
174. 28 U.S.C. § 1337. No jurisdictional amount is necessary.
175. The presence of only one tax decision is probably due to disruption in the
appellate process of those cases stemming from the Shell Oil decision. See note 112
supra.
176. Evidentiary problems played a significant role in several criminal cases. E.g.,
Caldwell v. State, 276 Md. 612, 349 A.2d 623 (1976) (defendant in a rape case, when
consent is in issue, may establish reputation for chastity of complainant in area
where she does not live).
177. Additionally, proper development and preservation of evidentiary questions
demands a good deal of effort at the trial level from bench and bar. It is possible that
such an effort is not made in all cases.
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involve review of the record, a review that has already been done -
or is available - in the Court of Special Appeals.
The portrait of the Court of Appeals of Maryland painted above
shows a cohesive and rather busy Court. Apart from a reluctance to
cabin publicly its discretion, there are no readily apparent problems.
The control that it can exercise over its own docket along with the
relatively low number of cases that demand the attention of the
Court ensure that its caseload will not be so heavy and burdensome
as to prevent it from attaining a high level of performance. Part II of



















The Court Of Special Appeals In The Court Of Appeals
A. Reported Opinions Of The Court Of Special Appeals
B. Unreported Opinions Of the Court Of Special Appeals
Frequency Of Separate Opinions
Judicial Persuasiveness
Voting Alignment
Primary Subject Matter Of Opinions
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TABLE I
A SAMPLE OF CERTIORARI PETITIONSa
Number of
A. Source of Jurisdiction Petitions
Certiorari 100
To Court of Special Appealsb 88
Reported 35
Unreported 53
To Circuit or Orphans' Court (expedited)c 5
To Circuit Court (on appeal to that court from a district court)d 7
B. Type of Case
Criminal 65
Certiorari Denied 55
Defendant as Petitioner 53
State as Petitioner 2
Certiorari Granted 10
Defendant as Petitioner 9
State as Petitioner 1
Civil and other Non-Criminal Matters 35
Certiorari Granted 10
Certiorari Denied 25
C. Type of Petition 100
Pro Se 5
Filed by an Attorney 95
D. Cases in which a Reply Petition was Filed 15




Limited Scope of Review 3
Additional Issue Raised Sua Sponte 1
Remanded to Court of Special Appeals 1
Certiorari Denied 80
Generally 79
Lack of Jurisdiction 1
a. The data in this Table were obtained by an examination of a random sample of
100 consecutive petitions for certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals in the September,
1975 Term.
b. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN., § 12-201 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
c. See id.
d. See id. at § 12-305.
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TABLE II
SOURCE OF CASESa
A. CERTIORARI Number Percentage
To the Court of Special Appeals
Decided in Court of Special Appeals 50 40.3
Expedited to Court of Appeals 53 42.7
To Circuit Courts 6 4.8
B. DIRECT APPEALS
Circuit Court 6 4.8
Tax Courtb 1 0.8
C. CERTIFIED QUESTIONS 2 1.6
D. PROFESSIONAL SUPERVISION 6 4.8
124
a. The data include all signed published decisions of the Court of Appeals decided
between September 1, 1975 and August 31, 1976, inclusive. Not included, unless noted
to the contrary, are the following:
1. All professional supervisory and disciplinary orders.
2. All per curiam opinions. However, In Re Appeals No. 1022 and No.
1081, 278 Md. 174, 359 A.2d 556 (1976), is included, despite a "per
curiam order," since a signed opinion was later issued by the Court.
3. All unsigned orders. In addition to disciplinary opinions, published
material omitted here are State v. Bruce, 277 Md. 92, 351 A.2d 896
(1976) (dismissal of writ of certiorari as having been improvidently
granted), and Luskin's, Inc. v. U.S. Pioneer Elec. Corp., - Md. -,
343 A.2d 890 (1975) (dismissed as moot).
Judge O'Donnell died on April 2, 1976. Unless he is stated to be the author of the
opinion, only those opinions adopted prior to his death are included in statistics that
relate to him. With the exception of Leatherbury v. Gaylord Fuel Corp., 276 Md. 367,"
347 A.2d 826 (1975), no opinion has been listed in any Table more than once, even
though the opinion decided more than one case. Leatherbury is treated differently
because the two cases decided by the Court in that opinion reached it by different
routes, and were separately docketed in the Court. Thus, in Tables II, III, and VIII,
two cases are listed as coming from Leatherbury; since Tables IV-VII focus on
opinions, Leatherbury is only counted once in those Tables.
b. This route to the Court of Appeals was held unconstitutional in Shell Oil Co. v.
Supervisor of Assessments, 276 Md. 36, 343 A.2d 521 (1975).
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TABLE III
COUNTY OF ORIGIN
PCT. OF PCT. OF
COUNTY No. OF CASES POPULATIONa CASES POPULATION
Allegany 3 83,175 2.6 2.02
Anne Arundel 9 344,056 7.8 8.35
Baltimore 18 637,114 15.7 15.46
Calvert 4 26,588 3.5 0.65
Caroline 0 21,668 - 0.53
Carroll 0 80,607 - 1.96
Cecil 2 56,005 1.7 1.36
Charles 1 60,546 0.9 1.47
Dorchester 1 29,634 0.9 0.72
Frederick 2 96,158 1.7 2.33
Garrett 2 23,694 1.7 0.57
Harford 2 136,381 1.7 3.31
Howard 2 97,994 1.7 2.38
Kent 1 16,706 0.9 0.41
Montgomery 17 571,558 14.8 13.87
Prince George's 15 677,848 13.0 16.45
Queen Anne's 0 20,186 - 0.49
St. Mary's 2 51,400 1.7 1.25
Somerset 0 19,458 - 0.47
Talbot 3 25,393 2.6 0.62
Washington 2 108,045 1.7 2.62
Wicomico 1 59,072 0.9 1.43
Worcester 0 26,621 - 0.65
Baltimore City 28 851,698 24.3 20.66
Totalb  115 4,121,605
a. The statistics for the population of each county are taken from U.S. DEPT. OF
COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, POPULATION ESTIMATES AND PROJECTIONS
(Series P-25, No. 668, April, 1977).
b. Table II indicates that the Court of Appeals decided 124 cases; Table III shows
the origin of 115 of them. The remaining nine opinions are accounted for in the
following way: one was from the Tax Court, two were certified questions originating
outside the state court system, and six dealt with professional supervision.
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FREQUENCY OF SEPARATE -OPINIONSa
The Court
UNANIMOUS OPINIONS
DECISIONS WITH CONCURRING OPINIONS
DECISIONS WITH DISSENTING OPINIONS
DECISIONS WITH BOTH CONCURRING





a For the purposes of this Table, the word "opinions" includes those situations in








Unanimous Opinions with Opinions with Opinions with
Opinions Concurrences Dissents Both
DIGGES 57.2 14.3 28.6 0.0
ELDRIDGE 81.3 0.0 18.8 0.0
LEVINE 80.0 0.0 20.0 0.0
MURPHY 87.5 6.3 6.3 0.0
O'DONNELL 50.0 10.0 30.0 10.0
SINGLEY 81.8 4.5 13.6 0.0
SMITH 63.2 5.3 31.6 0.0
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TABLE VIII
VOTING ALIGNMENTa
DIGGES ELDRIDGE LEVINE MURPHY O'DONNELL SINGLEY SMITH
Specially J 84.2 80.0 88.5 85.7 100.0 90.5 92.9
Assigned C 0.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Judges D 15.8 16.0 11.5 14.3 0.0 9.5 7.1
J 91.9 84.6 88.7 80.2 88.1 92.0
SMITH C 0.9 4.8 0.9 2.1 3.0 1.8
D 7.2 10.6 10.4 17.7 9.0 6.2
J 96.4 88.0 91.9 85.0 90.6
SINGLEY C 0.9 3.0 1.8 3.2 3.1
D 2.7 9.0 6.3 11.8 6.3
J 88.7 81.0 80.3 83.3
O'DONNELL C 1.6 3.2 4.5 3.7
D 9.7 15.9 15.2 13.0
J 81.5 75.0 81.9
MURPHY C 3.3 4.8 3.2
D 15.2 20.2 14.9
J 91.7 94.1





a. Key: J - The two judges joined in the same opinion. One may have
authored it.
C - The two judges agreed in the result, but in different opinions.
D - The two judges disagreed in the result.




PRIMARY SUBJECT MATTER OF OPINIONS
A. Public Law
Criminal
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APPENDIX B
APPELLATE JURISDICTION IN MARYLAND*
CHARTS:
1. Appeal from the District Court to the Circuit Court
2. Appeal from the Orphans' Court
3. Appeal from, or Certiorari to, the Circuit Court
4. Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
5. Questions Certified to the Court of Appeals
* The charts on the following pages illustrate only the routes available to the
parties once they are in court; they do not illustrate the proper course of action for
getting a dispute into the courts originally. Unless otherwise stated, all section
numbers in the following charts and accompanying notes refer to MD. CTS. & JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 12-101 to 12-702 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1976). Charts prepared by
Gary Aiken of the Law School Class of 1977.
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CHART i: APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT O THE CIRCUIT COURT
IDf D A THIS A CO.TENP No
PA CEEDNG?
YES N1'U~ll~T Yl -40(.):ATY ACTION. DECISION. ORDER. AR
I GAS TE D C §E 2 TREAT AS AN APPEAL JUDMENT SHALL E TREATED IN THE
D LE IN A CRIMINAL CASE.
CMAUE, TA ENTERERl CE AY CIE MARA.
9
NO
A A12-401( a 5A THERE A FINAL O§ IJOJENT IN T EDISTRICT COURT fYES' I ...E ... .. .
,No
12-4 AD(a): WAS THIS A CIVIL CASE AD
YES
S 2-4E (a): IS THE DEFENDANT 
NO
YESDDR) THE01.) AITSA THCSAEALEGN
AUNTIS TE APELLAE CD A A ADA() TH CRIINALCOUR IFHAT) THE TRAPL AL E D D T O
SAT. RELINIR ISTHE PPELATECADT.
4
I E E ENTENCAE ECIAT LL
| ,2 -4o111): KAY,APPEAL EVEN THOUGH NO
MP, I N R U I ON; OF..........E
SUHICHED Y UES T S NTRD
YES IO1-4IIEc,): DID THE 
PARTIES GREE
APPEAL .LOWED~~~ ~~~ ~ AV RREOD HED PPIA IH DITRD N 
DE NV NTEAPLAFOR
, T.ES1I ....DO O ITRI C Cou ............. RECUR?
YES~ ~ 240() APEA IS431) WO ST HHE RMI,
NT4 COT'TPRCE G
BALTIMORE~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~D IS I THE APPELLATE COURT. H I I ORTO H ONY|
COUR ISTHEAPPLLAE CURTES] . WAS S~) THE DISTRICT COU T SITNGI
§ 12H43(b) WASIE T IS AECIVL CRE?.
I NO
THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
CHART 2: APPEAL FRO" THE TPPPTXS UT"T
12-701(a)(2): JUDGMENT IS HOT
STAYED IF IT CAN BE CARRIED ON
BEFORE THE APPEAL IS DECIDED-
THAT IS, IF THE COIRT CAN
PROVIDE FOR CONFFORMI GO TO THE
DECISIO OF THE C "BT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS, WHETHER EVENTUALLY FOR
OR AGAINST APPELLANT.
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THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
CHART 4 : JURISDICTION OF IOL Wb.L( OF APPEAIS
12-201: WAS THE CASE DECIDED BY, OR
IS IT PENDING IN. THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS UPON APPEAL FRON A
CIRCUIT COURT OR AN ORPHANS' COURT?
21
1 2-607 (HW: THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS, ON ITS OWN MOTION OR THE
MOTION OF ANY PARTY, MAY ORDER THE
CERTIFICATION F A QUESTION OF LAW
TO THE APPELLATE COURTS OF ANY OTHER
STATE,
22
H 12-202: DID THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS DENY OR GRANT:
(1) LEAVE TO PROSECUTE AN APPEAL
IN A POST CONVICTION PROCEEDING?
(2) LEAVE TO APPEAL FROM A REFUSAL
TO ISSUE A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
SOUGHT FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING THE
THE RIGHT TO BAIL OR THE APPROPRIATE
NOUNT OF BAIL?
(3) LEAVE TO APPEAL IN AN INMATE GRIEVANCE
COM4ISSION PROCEEDING?
2 3
12-607(H): THE COURT OF
APPEALS, UN ITS ON MOTION OR IE
NOTION OF RAN PARTY. MAY ORDER THE
CERTIFICATION F A QUESTION OF
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CHART 5: QUESTIONIS CERTIFIED TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
12-601: IS THERE INVOLVED IN ANY
PROCEEDING BEFORE THE CERTIFYING
COURT A QUESTION OF MARYLAND LAW
WHICH MAY BE DETERMINATIVE OF THE
CAUSE THEN PENDING IN THE
CERTIFYING COURT AND AS TO WHICH
IT APPEARS TO THE CERTIFYING COURT
THERE IS NO CONTROLLING PRECEDENT
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND.
26
THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO ANSWER
THE QUESTION CERTIFIED.
THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
1. Section 12-402 does not specify whether an appeal from a contempt
proceeding is to be in the form of a trial de novo or a review of the district court record.
2. Section 12-101(d) defines "circuit court" to include "the circuit court for a
county, the Superior Court of Baltimore City, Court of Common Pleas, Baltimore City
Court, Circuit Court of Baltimore City, Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City, and
Criminal Court of Baltimore, or any of them."
3. See, e.g., MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 4-401 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
4. See note 2 supra.
5. See note 10 infra.
6. The only statutory basis for allowing interlocutory appeals from the district
courts is for contempt orders, § 12-402.
7. See, e.g., MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 4-301 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
8. The Revisor's Note to section 12-401(c) indicates that all guilty and nolo pleas
cases should be heard de novo; yet the statute authorizes an appeal on the record if
the parties agree. This potential conflict probably will not arise because a criminal
defendant would never agree to an on the record review in a case in which he pled
guilty or nolo contendre - an appeal he would surely lose.
9. MD. CTS. & JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-832 (Cum. Supp. 1976). The Maryland
Constitution authorizes district courts to sit as juvenile courts, if provided by law. MD.
CONsT. art. IV, § 41A. Only in Montgomery County has such jurisdiction been
provided; the circuit court sits as a juvenile court in all other counties and in
Baltimore City. Mn. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §3-801(i) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
Consequently, in the absence of any special provisions, appeals in juvenile cases in
Montgomery County would lie in the Montgomery County Circuit Court, § 12-403(a),
whereas all other appeals in juvenile cases would lie in the Court of Special Appeals,
§ 12-308(a)(1). Section 3-832 provides for statewide uniformity - as juvenile cases in
Montgomery County are to be treated as being decided by the Circuit Court, the right
of appeal in the County will also be to the Court of Special Appeals.
10. The right to appeal from ihe district courts is given only in civil and criminal
cases, § 12-401, and contempt cases, § 12-402. Although the district courts could
conceivably have original jurisdiction in some other type of action, see, e.g., MD. CTS.
& JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 4-201 (1974), there is no statutory basis for appeal from
the exercise of such jurisdiction.
11. Because the circuit court sits as an orphans' court in Harford and
Montgomery Counties, MD. CONST. art. IV, § 20, the right to appeal to the circuit court
from the orphans' court is inapplicable in those counties. See Schlossberg v.
Schlossberg, 275 Md. 600, 606, 343 A.2d 234, 239 (1975).
12. A careful reading of the Maryland Code raises the possibility that if a party
chooses to appeal to the circuit court, rather than to the Court of Special Appeals,
there is no further right of review: There is no right of appeal to the Court of Special
Appeals unless there is a final judgment by a circuit court in the exercise of "original,
special, limited, [or] statutory jurisdiction." Section 12-301. Because a circuit court
reviewing a decision of an orphans' court would appear to be exercising appellate
jurisdiction, later appeal to the Court of Special Appeals would be unavailable. See
§ 12-101(b) & (c). Additionally, the right to petition for certiorari to the Court of
Appeals exists only when the case (1) has been decided by, or is pending in, the Court
of Special Appeals, § 12-201, or (2) when a circuit court renders final judgment on an
appeal from a district court, § 12- 305. A review by a circuit court of an orphans' court
judgment (1) could never appear in the Court of Special Appeals, as explained above,
and (2) is not a review of a district court judgment; therefore, review by the Court of
Appeals would also appear to be foreclosed.
Nonetheless, in Moats v. Schoch, 24 Md. App. 453, 332 A.2d 43 (1975), the
Court of Special Appeals decided that it could review the circuit court's review of a
judgment of the Orphans' court. After reviewing the predecessors to §§ 12-301, 501, &
502, which expressly gave the Court of Special Appeals jurisdiction in such cases, it
noted: "Although the express provision for further right of appeal to the Court of
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Special Appeals does not appear in the statutes as revised, the substance of the former
law was not intended to be changed." Id. at 454-55 n.1, 332 A.2d at 44-45 n.1.
In deciding which avenue of appeal to take from the orphans' court, a party
should bear in mind that the Court of Special Appeals may not review a summary
orphans' court proceeding that was based upon the testimony of witnesses unless the
appellant immediately gave notice of the intent to appeal and requested that the
testimony be reduced to writing, § 12-501.
13. See note 2 supra.
14. The judgment must be a final one; thus an appeal from the granting of a
motion for summary judgment, Felger v. Nichols, 30 Md. App. 278, 352 A.2d 330
(1976), or from the granting of a motion for directed verdict, Eastgate Associates v.
Apper, 276 Md. 698, 350 A.2d 661 (1976), is premature until judgment is entered. But if
the trial court is denying an absolute constitutional right, final judgment is not
needed. The constitutional right is not deemed absolute if the trial court is "rightfully
exercising discretion" as to the functioning of the right. Compare Neal v. State, 272
Md. 323, 322 A.2d 887 (1974) (determination of double jeopardy involves no discretion)
with Pearlman v. State, 226 Md. 67, 172 A.2d 395 (1961) (right to free trial transcript
for appeal is subject to preliminary finding of indigency, which involves discretion;
upon finding of indigency, the right is absolute).
Although § 12-101(f) defines the term "final judgment," it has not been
construed as determining when an appeal may be taken. See, e.g., Sokol v. Nattans,
23 Md. App. 600, 608 n.10, 329 A.2d 115, 120 n.10 (1974).
15. Only those interlocutory orders enumerated in § 12-303 are appealable prior to
final judgment. See Rocks v. Brosius, 241 Md. 612, 647, 217 A.2d 531, 551 (1966). There
is also a right to appeal from the denial of an absolute constitutional right, see note 14
supra.
16. MD. CONST. art. IV, § 22, provides that the decision of a circuit court sitting en
banc shall be
conclusive, as against the party, at whose motion said points, or questions
were reserved; but such decision in banc shall not preclude the right of Appeal
... to the adverse party, in those cases, civil or criminal, in which appeal...
to the Court of Appeals may be allowed by Law.
This provision was ratified long before the creation of the Court of Special Appeals,
and some changes in the operation of § 22 should be noted.
First, initial appellate review of circuit court action is now vested exclusively
in the Court of Special Appeals, § 12-308(b). Consequently, although the language of
the constitution purports only to authorize appeal to the Court ojAppeals for en banc
circuit court decisions, the Court of Special Appeals has stated that it will now hear
such appeals. Dobson v. Mulcare, 26 Md. App. 699, 704 & n.4, 338 A.2d 898, 901-02 &
n.4 (1975).
Secondly, the adverse party (that party not moving for the en banc review)
may not petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals until the case is either pending
in, or has been decided by, the Court of Special Appeals, § 12-201. The only avenue for
certiorari directly to the circuit court is § 12-305. Because that section only allows
petitioning for certiorari when the circuit court has granted a final judgment on a
review of a district court, it is inapplicable here. (This does not conflict with the right
granted in article IV, § 22 of the Maryland Constitution, quoted above, to appeal to the
Court of Appeals from a decision of the circuit court en banc, since that provision
vests jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals only if "allowed by law." As the General
Assembly has not seen fit to include en banc review by the circuit court in § 12-305, no
such jurisdiction is "allowed by law.").
Finally, the right of the parties to apply for certiorari after Court of Special
Appeals review must be examined. Section 12-201 authorizes any party to file a
petition for certiorari "in any case or proceeding pending in or decided by the Court of
Special Appeals upon appeal from a circuit court ...." If the words "circuit court"
are construed to include circuit courts en banc, the following anomolies result: (1)
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Section 12-201 could be construed to allow the party moving for the en banc hearing
below to petition for certiorari, since § 12-201 grants that right to any party. However,
such a construction would be unconstitutional because article IV, § 22 states that the
decision of the en banc circuit court is "conclusive" against that party. See Buck v.
Folkers, 269 Md. 185, 186, 304 A.2d 826, 827 (1973) ("The decision of the court en banc
is conclusive, final, and non-appealable by the party who sought the en banc review
(the moving party)"). (2) If the adverse party petitions for certiorari, and it is granted,
the case has been appealed twice (i.e., to the Court of Special Appeals and to the
circuit court en banc - that review by the circuit court en banc is an "appeal" may be
garnered from State Roads Comm. v. Smith, 224 Md. 537, 540-42, 168 A.2d 705, 707
(1961)) and then reviewed by the Court of Appeals. This violates the statutory scheme
set up by Title 12 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, which allows only
one appeal and one review by certiorari in any given case.
Consequently, the most logical construction of § 12-201 would be that it does
not allow review by the Court of Appeals in such cases.
17. Only the person cited for contempt may prosecute the appeal. Becker v.
Becker, 29 Md. App. 339, 347 A.2d 911 (1975).
18. Not only is there no appeal to the Court of Special Appeals - there is also no
right to petition for certiorari review by the Court of Appeals. The reason for this is
two-fold: if the circuit court exercises appellate jurisdiction, the only avenue to the
Court of Appeals is § 12-305. And if the circuit court exercises any other form of
jurisdiction, the only avenue to the Court of Appeals is to have the case decided by, or
pending in, the Court of Special Appeals, § 12-201.
19. The state may appeal in a juvenile proceeding. See In re Anderson, 272 Md.
85, 321 A.2d 516 (1974).
20. See note 12 supra.
21. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-201 (Cum. Supp. 1977) also purports
to grant jurisdiction to the Courts in cases pending in, or decided by, the Court of
Special Appeals upon appeal from the Maryland Tax Court. That jurisdiction was
determined to be unconstitutional in Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor of Assessments, 276
Md. 36, 343 A.2d 521 (1975). (The Maryland Tax Court is not a court; it is an
administrative agency. As such, all appeals must first be to a circuit court.) The
Maryland General Assembly apparently overlooked Shell Oil in its 1977 recodification
of § 12-201, 1977 Md. Laws, ch. 555, § 1.
22. See note 25 infra.
23. Section 12-202 was repealed and reenacted twice by the 1977 session of the
General Assembly. The first session law added a new subsection, § 12-202(4), to
prohibit review by the Court of Appeals in those cases in which the Court of Special
Appeals granted or denied '"lleave to appeal in an inmate grievance commission
proceeding." 1977 Md. Laws, ch. 311, § 3. The second session law made no reference to
chapter 311; it eliminated § 12-202(2) (Cum. Supp. 1976) (which had prohibited review
by way of certiorari when the Court of Special Appeals granted or denied "[leave to
prosecute an appeal in a defective delinquent proceeding") and it did not include the
new subsection enacted by chapter 311. 1977 Md. Laws ch. 678, § 4. This apparently
confusing result may be resolved through an application of MD. ANN. CODE art. 1, § 17
(1976 Repl. Vol.):
If two or more amendments to the same section or subsection of the Code
are enacted at the same or different sessions of the General Assembly, and
one of them makes no reference to and takes no account of the other or others,
the amendments shall be construed together, and each shall be given effect, if
possible and with due regard to the wording of their titles. If the amendments
are irreconcilable and it is not possible to construe them together, the latest in
date of final enactment shall prevail.
A reading of chapters 311 and 678 would suggest that each intended to give effect to
the specific changes made, therefore, the most reasonable conclusion is that § 12-202
now consists of subsections (1) and (3) of the 1976 codification and subsection (4) of
the chapter 311 enactment.
1977]
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Despite the otherwise seemingly clear requirements of § 12-202, the Court of
Appeals has granted review by way of certiorari in cases in which the Court of Special
Appeals granted leave to appeal in a post conviction proceeding, Jourdan v. State, 275
Md. 495, 341 A.2d 388 (1975), and in a defective delinquent proceeding, Moss v.
Director, - Md. -, 369 A.2d 1011 (1977). Although acknowledging the mandates
of § 12-202, the court has justified review by asserting that "once the Court of Special
Appeals grants leave to appeal in such a case and transfers the case to its appeal
docket, the matter takes the posture of a regular appeal, and we do have jurisdiction
under § 12-201 . . . to review the Court of Special Appeals' decision on the appeal
itself." Jourdan v. State, 275 Md. at 506 n.4, 341 A.2d at 394-95 n.4.
This rationale was strongly attacked by Judge Orth in a dissenting opinion in
Moss:
I cannot agree that merely because procedures adopted to bring a granted
application for leave to appeal to argument before the Court of Special
Appeals are the same as those to bring a direct appeal to argument, the
application for leave to appeal attains the status of a direct appeal so as to
confer on the Court of Appeals jurisdiction to review the proceeding when
such review is so plainly prohibited by § 12-202. The position of the Court of
Appeals is manifestly incongruous in that its reasoning does not serve to
permit a review of a defective delinquent or post conviction proceeding when
the application for leave to appeal is denied by the Court of Special Appeals,
no matter what the ground stated in the opinion accompanying the denial.
And, perhaps of even more significance, is that under the reasoning of the
Court of Appeals it may not review such a proceeding when the Court of
Special Appeals grants the application for leave to appeal and does not
transfer the case to the appeal docket but, as it may under the rules, simply
issues an opinion in which the order appealed from is affirmed, reversed or
modified, or the case remanded for further proceedings, without briefs being
filed or argument heard.
- Md. at -, 369 A.2d at 1017.
24. See note 25 infra.
25. The Maryland Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act produces the
following curious results - while either the Court of Appeals or the Court of Special
Appeals may certify a question "to the highest appellate court or the intermediate
appellate court of any other state," § 12-607(a), questions certified to Maryland may
only be answered by the Court of Appeals, § 12-307(3). See Smith v. Gray Concrete
Pipe Co., 267 Md. 149, 154-55, 297 A.2d 721, 725 (1972).
26. Section 12-601 would seem to allow certification to the Court of Appeals even
if there is controlling precedent in the Court of Special Appeals, as long as the Court
of Appeals has remained silent, or uncommitted, on the issue.
27. While § 12-601 could be read to give the Court of Appeals discretion in
deciding whether or not to answer a certified question ("The Court of Appeals may
answer .. ", § 12-601 (emphasis added)), an equally plausible reading of the statute
would be that the word "may" is simply a jurisdictional grant. The section would then
read, "If a question is certified, then the Court of Appeals is allowed to answer. .. ."
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